S14, Ep10 | The Corruption of COP

Amy: [00:00:00] Hello and welcome back to Drilled. I'm Amy Westervelt In a little under a week, the Annual UN Climate Summit, the conference of the parties– it's called that because these are all of the people who are party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change or the UNFCCC and they meet every year to talk about what their governments are gonna do about climate change.

This is year 30, and I think it's fair to say that this process is facing a real crisis of legitimacy at the moment. This year, the US government has barred any of its officials from attending to negotiate, so that should be interesting. For the last couple years, the gloves have been completely off when it comes to fossil fuel executives being involved in this process, we had first COP 28 in Abu Dhabi where the president of the national oil company was also the president of the Climate Summit. And then last year in Baku, in Azerbaijan, where similarly loads of folks involved in the petroleum business were part of the COP organizing committee, and there were just blatant oil deals happening all over the conference.

This year's COP is being held in the Brazilian Amazon, which is quite interesting. And the Brazilian government and the conference organizing committee have really made a commitment to information integrity around climate. They wanna highlight this issue. They would like to see something around information integrity actually being adopted into the final commitments coming out of this COP, and they have made a big commitment to keeping things like climate denial out of this conference.

However, as we know on this show, there are lots of different ways that disinformation can make its way into climate conversations. And what we're gonna talk about today is the way that climate obstruction makes its way into international negotiations. So not just the COP, but also the intergovernmental panel on climate change.

These are not, you know, super objective uncorrupted and uncorruptible processes as much as they're often described that way. And as much as we might like for them to be. So today a very interesting conversation with Carrie Derick from University of Geneva and Eduardo Viola from the Institute of International Relations in Brazil, about how climate obstruction shows up in international negotiations.

That conversation is coming up after this quick break.

Amy Westervelt: I'm gonna start with the very, very basics, which is to have you guys define for people what is the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and why are we looking at these bodies for climate obstruction?

Eduardo Viola: The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the basic document, the foundational document of the climate regime. Okay? And the most important thing is it's settled the goal that humanity should, reduce emissions for avoiding dangerous climate change.

This was very important document sudden in 1992, was very important example of multilateral limbs at the end of the Cold War and with the optimistic spirit, let's say, of great potential of human collaboration. Okay?

Kari DePryck: Yep. And We have the UN FCC because the [00:04:00] IPCC, uh, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was established in 1988, before the UN FCC was established to build the case scientifically for an international climate negotiations.

Since the nineties, the IPCC has been producing main assessment reports. So now we are entering the seventh assessment cycle. And all those reports and assessments have been the scientific basis of the, the negotiations. That's why the IPCC does play a key role in how we understand the climate problems as well as the solutions that's being discussed a lot in the negotiations. And that's why we also wanted to include it because it's quite related. And we often see that many of the experts, the government representatives, they actually [00:05:00] travel from IPCC to UNFCCC meetings. So there is a, a clear connection and links between those two institutions.

Amy Westervelt: Great. Okay. And you mentioned in the chapter that there's only kind of recently been research that's laid out a framework for looking at obstruction in the UNFCCC. Can you say a little bit more about that? What is that research and what is the framework for looking at obstruction??

Kari DePryck: So there has been already quite some research on climate obstruction in the UNFCCC. By Joanna Deplage, for instance, but they were focusing on some specific countries. And what we've seen with the publication recently by Danielle Falzon and her colleagues is this kind of first attempts at having a comprehensive framework of what climate obstruction means in the UNFCCC and in their paper published in Global Environmental Politic, They do [00:06:00] identify four different main ways to to do obstruction. One being limiting the scope of an issue. Whether it's being only discussed within a dialogue, whether it is going to lead to some decisions that parties are supposed to take into account. We have also the question of reducing transparency in terms of how much data is available to understand a specific problem, knowing that the authors actually use the case of loss and damage in their study. We have also questions around manipulating language. How are we going to, to define and speak about loss and damage? And for instance, there is this interesting case in the negotiations where the negotiations with use and speak of loss and damage in the singular and with capital letters, whereas in the [00:07:00] IPCC and in some of the technical discussions in the UNFCCC, they will mention losses and damages.

So using the plural and lower cases. And the final element is the question of promoting non transformative solutions. So solutions that do not necessarily question the structural aspects and reasons that are responsible for the climate crisis we are in.

Eduardo Viola: Yeah, I would like to add a kind of more structural dimension of obstruction, that is what are the, the basis of the behavior of states. And it's a lot related to some str structural dimension. Like for example the carbon intensity of their economies. The level, the share of global carbon emissions the per [00:08:00] capita emissions, the dependence of their economies on fossil fuels.

So those are I mean, those, those issues are not matter of negotiation, but they shape the the behavior of most states. Not all the states, but most states. And so the, there is this always present in the negotiation. This, that the states don't don't want to, to do, for example, to if they have high carbon intensity in their economy, don't want to reduce the carbon intensity, or if they have a trajectory of growing carbon emission, they don't want to diminish the growing trajectory of their carbon emission and so on.

Amy Westervelt: Right. And that comes up in the IPCC as well, right? That they, the higher, well, at least the [00:09:00] fossil fuel producers or the bigger AG producers tend to bring those issues in at the IPCC level as well.

Right? Not just at the COPs

Kari DePryck: Yes, totally. And maybe to name a few. What we have seen from different studies is, I mean, we have the usual suspects like Saudi Arabia for instance. There has been a lot of work on how the Saudi is trying to obstruct the deliberations within UNFCCC and the IPCC. But we have also seen not heavily around questions of loss and damage equity issues at the United States as well. European countries also being more and more critical about acknowledging what it means to take seriously, especially financially, what it means to take loss and damage and compensation seriously. But we have also seen global south countries as well, and Eduardo probably knows better, but [00:10:00] also countries like China, Brazil, India also tend to try to put more emphasis on their right to development. Not acknowledging that today they also are big economies and also pollute far more than they did 10 years ago.

Amy Westervelt: Mm-hmm. Yeah. Actually, I wanted to ask you to define the principle of common, but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities. Can you define what that means and, and how it gets leveraged in these negotiations

Eduardo Viola: well in, I mean, this is a key pillar of the Rio Convention, but at the Rio it is,

Amy Westervelt: Mm-hmm.

Eduardo Viola: Big. Okay. So, and so, and apart from dividing the world in a very simplified world. Developed countries and developing countries. Okay. And so. [00:11:00] It doesn't consider that developing countries are extremely stratified.

I mean, in terms of per capita income. So, and what, this is one of the problems of the Rio convention that this has not used, it, the classification of countries of the world Bank that is much better, more sophisticated, and classify the countries in four levels. High income, high middle income, low middle income, and low income.

Okay, so one problem with this principle is how high middle income countries use being in the category of developing countries for avoiding taking significant responsibility. Okay, but the principle say that everybody is responsible. For climate change, but some countries are more responsible and some countries have the [00:12:00] obligation, the countries that are more responsible, that have produced it historically, the idea historically is, is debatable.

A lot of things remain vague. So, the interpretation of the principle became a major problem in the dynamic of the convention. In my view, this is one of the weakest, not, not the principle, but the fact that there was not a more complex classification of developing countries.

Kari DePryck: Maybe what we can also add is that the signature of the Paris Agreement in 2015 kind of changed a bit how CBDRRC is being interpreted and discussed because it adds in the light of national circumstances. And that's kind of supposed, it's another of those very vague expressions that you find in the Paris Agreement and in the UNFCCC. But [00:13:00] it, it is supposed to highlight the fact that some economies now in some countries do play a bigger role in how much they, they emit and especially emerging countries. And that's supposed to be assigned to bring them on board also to, to take ambitious actions. So it's an an attempt to try to add another layer of differentiation in the UNFCCC but knowing that it's still very contested and still today being discussed a lot in the negotiations.

Amy Westervelt: I wanted to ask you more about that as well, because there was that change and there were a few other kind of key changes in the Paris Agreement that shifted things a little bit. So I was hoping you could talk about that. You mentioned you know, a, like this, this difference around developing countries, but I know there was also the hybrid multilateralism thing introduced and, and kind of bringing non-state [00:14:00] actors in more.

So. I, I wonder if you could talk a bit about how Paris changed the negotiations and also the pathways to obstruction a little bit.

Eduardo Viola: The Paris Agreement is a product of the failure of the reform of the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol set a kind of mandatory, goals of reduction emission for developed countries. Okay. So the, the, the Kyoto Protocol was based in the idea of precision in relation to the obligations of developed countries but not in relation to developing country, of course.

So what happened is that at the time of the reform of the Kyoto Protocol, there was an idea that the principle of mandatory the principle of having mandatory goals should be extended to all countries. of course, very different kind of [00:15:00] mandatory according to their, to the per capita income and cap and, and capabilities, let's say.

But this failed Okay. For many reasons. Yeah. And so the Paris Agreement was kind of, second best in relation to something and stronger agree at the same time. It is a principle that bottom up each country say what I can do and and I'll implement. And there is no idea of any punishment if you don't implement significant punishment, let's say. Okay, that it wasn't the Kyoto Protocol, but was for, didn't have enough teeth anyway. So, from this point of view, this is a major change. It's universal that any country has obligations, but the obligations are defined by each country according to.

Whatever criteria. [00:16:00] Okay. And there is, and there is no let's say there is no, these obligations are not mandatory. were attempts of saying, okay, these are the, the goals should be mandatory should be legally binding. Okay. But there was the strong opposition of the United States and India to this kind of in, well, India is more complex, okay?

But the, the, the United States, not because of the, not necessarily the Obama administration. Was the case, but the Obama administration was saying, knew that the to pass in the American Senate, any treat that had legally binding goals of reduction emissions would not pass that this, the American Senate that is very difficult to pass any international treaty in the American Senate historically.[00:17:00]

Amy Westervelt: Yeah.

Kari DePryck: On your point on the role of non-state actors I think that's also an important shift that we saw with the signature of the, the Paris agreement, where we knew while negotiating the, the treaty that adding up the voluntary commitments by countries wouldn't lead us to limit the the global warming to two degree or 1.5. And that's what, what is being called the emission gap and the, the idea. Was that this emission gap could be reduced by giving non-state actors, and especially obviously the, the private sector a bigger role in the, in the transition. So that's why with the Paris Agreement, we have this whole discussions around hybrid multilateralism, about orchestration of the action [00:18:00] of non-state actors to try to reduce this emissions gap in a context in which in the past the private sector was kind of more like either opposed or in favor of of a treaty of the Kyoto Protocol, notably. But then we saw really changes around the Paris Agreement with the private sectors and the industry wanting to play also a bigger role and also not only at the national level, but also internationally to bring up and to, to have this kind of bigger dialogue and initiatives being also discussed at the multilateral level.

Amy Westervelt: So you mentioned in this chapter, and we talked a little bit about it already, but the sort of operations of the UNFCCC and the IPCC and how those enable or empower obstruction. And I was hoping you could talk about that a little bit, just what are some of the ways that, these organizations [00:19:00] are set up to allow obstruction.

Kari DePryck: I can start and mention two and then Eduardo can, can jump in anytime. I I think first there is the question of access and participation to both the IPCC and UNFCCC in the sense that even though everyone, like every representative of a country is welcome to participate and be part of those institutions.

It does require quite a lot of resources, human resources, but also financial resources. For the IPCC, it also mean quite a lot of epistemic resources, being able to understand the very technical discussions that go on in the IPCC and that that does mean– because they are huge asymmetries and structural asymmetries between countries– that does mean that often those who have the most capacities are also the most represented [00:20:00] in those institutions because they can send more delegates. They can also stay overnight. They can stay longer if the negotiations do not finish on time. And so ab obviously that makes them have bigger influence on what's going on in those institutions.

And and the second I think is, and that's also similar and it's a practice and procedure in both institution, is the fact that decisions are taken by consensus, which means that, every country has a say and a voice, and can at any time oppose a decision, oppose an agreement, which means that everything has to be made to try to find a compromise to get them on board.

And that gives some countries, and especially those countries who wants to do obstruction also a big leeway and a big way to kind of really try to to slow down the debate or have their views reflected.

Eduardo Viola: Yeah, this is actually the, the [00:21:00] idea of the consensus is one of the major vulnerabilities of con the convention of, and the whole history of the, the regime. Okay? So that is that the just one country, and particularly if it, if it is a country with some power, again, it doesn't even, not, doesn't need to be the strongest power.

You can you can diminish. The, the what is the agreement? And so this is the idea that the consensus give the negotiation to the final decision of minimum common denominator, meaning the minimal ambition for fighting global warming.

Amy Westervelt: When I was reading this chapter, especially this part about how I don't know, access and resources really come to play in the IPCC and the UNFCCC, it also made me think about the academic [00:22:00] research and the funding of it and how much more industry funding there is for that research in some countries than others.

And I wonder I guess, yeah, just how much that comes into play as an obstruction tactic as well.

Kari DePryck: I think yeah, that's a difficult question because yeah, the IPCC is not being funded by the, the private sector, it's being funded by the governments on a voluntary basis. But it's true that in the selection of the authors, it's possible because it's being done based on the list provided by governments.

It's possible to have authors who have been working for fossil fuel companies. We know, for instance, of authors from ExxonMobil or Saudi Aram Aramco, who have been authors in some of the IPCC assessments. But I, and I wouldn't say it's necessarily [00:23:00] because of them that we have this kind of openness to carbon capture and storage or carbon dioxide removal, which, which has been documented in the last reports. I think it, in general, the IPCC also wants to work very closely with the private sector and also wants, and it's part of a bigger narrative in which non-state actors and the private sector does play a big role in providing the solutions.

So it's, it's really part of a bigger change. And that's, that's what the, I think the interesting point. Yeah. IPCC was kind of said, okay, let's, let's have closer links. And we know from the previous president, Hoesung Lee, for instance, was really open to having greater dialogues and input from from the, the big business industry. And so that might be one of the reasons through the leadership of the [00:24:00] IPCC, through the authors who are being part of the, the report that we tend to give those technologies big roles in, in the transition. Even though it's been criticized a lot, IPCC is aware of that. They, they have been discussions about how to also show some of the negative impacts that those, those technologies can have not on, on biodiversity for instance or water security.

Amy Westervelt: Yeah. Interesting. Okay. Can we talk about which countries are the biggest problem? Which countries are the big obstructors? We know the United States so we can talk about the United States more for sure. But what are, the big obstructors, you, you mentioned them in this chapter, and I'd like to have you kind of list them and then give some examples of the kinds of things that they do to [00:25:00] obstruct at at the international level.

Kari DePryck: Yeah, so I guess the most obvious one, the most that has been discussed a lot in the literature, also in media reporting is, is Saudi Arabia. Because Saudi Arabia is very open and in a way, and very, like, not deranged or it's not posing Saudi Arabia problem of being finger pointed as obstructing the negotiations and putting its, its video.

I think it's even part of the DNA, it's part of the identity of the Saudi delegation to be, to have this very kind of aggressive very forthcoming position and in the negotiations. So that's the kind of obvious one. I, I would say, but in a way, in a way, extremely well done. I [00:26:00] mean, it's, it's impressive to see the Saudi navigate the different rooms and have their point of view being presented and listed in the discussion.

So it's, it's very effective and it's, it's not something they, they are not, they are really thinking, I think, very clearly about how to organize themselves and how to, to influence the negotiations. The second one probably the biggest in a, in a way, but it's the United States, United States– I think the difference with the Saudi is that United States cares about its about the public opinion. It cares about what. What people are going to say and see of, of the United States within the negotiations, but also outside as, as wanting to have this kind of leadership role in the negotiations.

Even though in practice we know the United States has left and withdrew from the Kyoto protocol, from the Paris Agreement. Is [00:27:00] a big opposer of historical responsibilities, which I think is obviously a very big problem given that we need to have ambitious, but also just action. The United States also has been really opposing a lot the loss and damage discussions in the negotiations really opposing any discussions in terms of reparation and compensation. And that's why it took so many decades to have the loss and damage fund

established at COP 27.

Eduardo Viola: There is a significant di difference between Republican and democratic administration. So in general speaking it's a country that produce a lot of obstruction even in Democratic administration. But I mean the, particularly the, the Biden administration was the, the first time that the United States has really a, a climate policy because Obama didn't have. [00:28:00] It was take some measures by executive order, but didn't have a climate policy. So we have a climate policy in United States for the first time that is basic in promoting renewable energy and nuclear energy, not in reducing because this, this, this is wouldn't have support in Congress.

But anyway, the difference between the Biden administration and the second Trump administration in terms of the impacting the global climate policy is giant, giant. I mean, the impact of, and this is one problem that is very important. We are now living in a world that's extremely conflicted, extremely based in the priority of hard geopolitics considerations. Okay. In a, a well in which the military spending is growing a lot, most countries, eh, and so the world in which we are now is somehow [00:29:00] the opposite of the world of 92 when the climate regime was born, and even the world of 2015 when the Paris Agreement was signed.

Okay? So the negotiations were always difficult for the reasons we have mentioned and are in the chapter. And now the, the negotiations have a much more obstacle because of the, this news geopolitical and particularly now with the Trump administration, that is not, even, not being, not being in the, in the agreement it is impacting, he's impacting a lot, many countries.

Okay? So openly or not. So, this is a consideration by United States, and I will say that another obstacle that has be, that is, has been important is the position of China until 2014. Previous to Paris agreement, [00:30:00] China was has a non-cooperative policy at all. Okay? In 2014, after the negotiation between Obama and Xi Jinping there was, it moved from a non-cooperative to partially cooperative position in the negotiations. So this was very important for sure, and risky, the Paris Agreement would not happen without this change in the Chinese position. But still so until now, see China, China has become right. A continued building coal feed the thermopower thermopower plants but at the same time is a superpower of of renewables.

Okay? And this is very important for China and for the world. But still, China continues, consider itself as a developing country, and this is a major problem for the advance of the negotiations.

Amy Westervelt: Can I have you guys define [00:31:00] the difference between procedural and substantive obstruction, and then maybe give some examples of those both in the UNFCCC and the IPCC.

Kari DePryck: Yeah, so I can give you broadly a, a kind of overview and then we can discuss examples. So we, we wanted in this chapter to have a easy way to, look at obstruction in a way and that's why we differentiated between procedural obstruction and substantial obstruction, knowing that obviously they are also clearly related. So looking at procedural obstruction is more when when a country tried to delay the deliberation when it puts its veto on some decisions. As, as we mentioned, that it's very important to, for [00:32:00] decisions to be taken by consensus. So some countries do use a lot. Their veto to have the views reflected in in the documents.

And those can be UNFCCC policy decisions, but also IPCC Summaries for Policymakers. It can be also about taking the floor a lot to delay the deliberations that can then, then will be extended over the day. Sometimes will be also extended overnight, which makes it very difficult for small delegations to be part of the, of the negotiations. And substantial obstruction is then more about being obstructive on how a specific thematic area is going to be addressed and object. This can be done by delaying the discussions. And this can be for instance when, discussing fossil fuel phase out in the negotiations. And [00:33:00] that took so many years and decades even to, to finally have a, a proper discussion about fossil fuel phase out. But there are other examples in the chapter about yeah, loss and damage discussions and how for a long time it has been kind of framed around the question of adaptation.

And that only recently some negotiations have been allowed also to develop independently on loss and damage.

Amy Westervelt: Something I thought was really interesting in this chapter, and maybe surprising for people who don't follow this so closely, is that there's almost never is energy being discussed explicitly in these negotiations. So I, I wonder if you could talk about that and, and sort of why it was a big deal that in you know, at, at the wrap up of, I think it was COP 28, that they [00:34:00] actually mentioned fossil fuels in in those negotiations. But yeah, why is energy not being talked about in, in explicit terms in these negotiations?

Eduardo Viola: I mean, I would say that there was, at the moment of the Rio Convention, there was, this, is all these things are related to the limitations and vulnerabilities of the Rio Convention. Okay? So what happened at that time countries that were leading like the European Union. They were expecting that the most important was to reach a consensus to reach a treaty. Okay? So then, for example, if United States was against introducing energy openly in, in the discussion. Also, obviously all the oil exported, for example. Okay. At that. So it is amazing that [00:35:00] energy is not discussed.

It's amazing that just in 28 there was a mention to going transition away from fossil years. Really, really is, and this is kind of say in my view the general limitations of the convention, eh, that anyway has produced global public awareness about the issue because imagine without the convention, the world, without the convention, without a, an, the annual discussions about this.

So the public awareness in the world about climate change would be dramatically lower. Okay. So the convention has been very important. The negotiations sometimes have been not useful, but generally there is a trajectory of progress, but with all these limitations, so I would say energy is very, is not discussed [00:36:00] because all the countries that are carbon intensive in the production of energy are against.

Kari DePryck: And there is this famous statement by Saudi Arabia which, which was that the UNFCCC is not an energy treaty. So we should discuss, we can discuss emissions but we shouldn't go too much into the details of how we can reduce those emissions and how we can also think about fossil fuel phase outs.

But what is, what is interesting is, and that's part of the, chapter as well, and that's work that has been done by a colleague of ours, Stefan Aku, which is that. In a way, fossil fuels have been discussed in in the UNFCCC policy meetings, but through the impact of climate policy on fossil fuel economies, and that's [00:37:00] what is being called response measures.

And it's, it's agenda item in the negotiations that has been there for several decades. And that's where the consequences of the response measures are being discussed and what can be done to help countries that are heavily dependent on fossil fuel for the economy, what can be done, done to support their transition.

That's obviously a agenda item and, and thematic area where Saudi Arabia has been pushing a lot to consider those very important, obviously consequences. And today we discussed that as well on the just transition agenda item.

Amy Westervelt: Yeah, that's super, super interesting. Kind of related to this I wanted to talk about this phrase "unabated emissions" and why it's important for, for people to understand [00:38:00] what that means and how it gets used as a loophole.

Kari DePryck: Yeah. Well, it's a bit related to to, to the previous question on the role of some of the technologies like carbon dioxide removal and carbon capture and storage in, in the IPCC And it's true that this, this "unabated emission" statement became very important, very much discussed because it was mentioned in the Glasgow Pact at cop 26. And the idea was that they was supposed to have a phase down of in abated emissions from coal. Notably, and, it's part of those terms that allow for consensus to be found. And because "unabated" is supposed [00:39:00] to prolong the life of the fossil fuel industry and infrastructure, because there is this, yeah, this expectations that by deploying at large scale carbon dioxide capture and, and storage we can continue to to extract fossil fuel from the ground. But then capture the emissions at the source and store them underground. And this is a technology that has been discussed for several decades. There was actually a special report produced by the IPCC in 2005, if I remember correctly, which was expected to assess the role that CCS could play in the transition. It's still, it hasn't scaled up as expected. There are still a lot of uncertainties, a lot of debate, but we can see that it came back in the discussions because some countries and economies [00:40:00] really hope very strongly that those technologies can help them continue extract for fossil fuel. And there is not very interesting discussion going on in, in the IPCC about how do we define unabated emissions what is unabated infrastructure?

And it's very, it's been going on because the IPCC obviously after COP 26 became involved in the discussions about this, this definition. So there have been authors IPCC authors trying to find some kind of definition to assess whether an infrastructure is really producing unabated emissions or, or not.

Amy Westervelt: Interesting. Okay. We've talked about non-state actors a little bit and how they've been increasingly welcomed and active in this process. Can you talk a little bit about [00:41:00] specifically, what types of non-state actors are getting involved, and where do they play a role in obstruction? obstruction?

Eduardo Viola: There are, a lot of non-state actors, but we can classify them in, in in say, NGOs and business players. And also there is more recently another non-state actor that is non-national, state actor, but in some countries are important, particularly in democratic federative countries, eh that is the subnational government.

But the most important are the business and the NGOs. At the beginning of the COPs the idea or not of non-state actors were much more NGOs because the business community was reluctant to the whole idea of the convention, okay? When there, there were some changes in perception in the business community, [00:42:00] particularly promoted by the World Economic Forum since 2014, 15, and so on.

So the business participation became very, very strong and particularly increased dramatically the, the participation of business that are related to fossil fuels corporation. So we have today this worlds of the business community and the NGOs community. And there are some NGOs that are not independent NGOs representing civil society, more public good like in the past, but that represent business interests and sometimes carbon intensive business interests.

And we can say that there are some business non-state actors that are more progressive. And they recognize the, the need of decarbonization. And there are [00:43:00] other businesses non-state actors that are clearly conservative. They are in favor, the status quo and with different discourses that are not open saying that. And we have also the NGO community. Most of the NGO community is much more representative of civil societies, national civil societies, and global civil society. But there are also significant part of growing of NGOs that are much more dependent on related of to the business community and both side. But particularly what is the major problem is with NGOs that are related to fossil fuels non-state actors.

Kari DePryck: yeah, maybe building on on [00:44:00] that, what we see is because of this whole Paris agreement, which is expected to orchestrate action by non-state actors. We see a great interest from non-state actors and especially the private sector in COPs. They go to COPs because they can showcase their let latest technologies and solutions.

They can be part of different side events where they show how they are becoming leaders in the, in the transition. They are also there to lobby government representatives. And they have been studies and by, by different organizations really showing how they are more and more lobbyists from the fossil fuel industry being part not only of of government delegations, but also going to COPs to. part of side events to do also deals with [00:45:00] different countries and, and actors. I think there is still in general some more knowledge and research that would be needed to really understand what those actors are actually doing at COP. And what's their potential of influencing the negotiations, knowing that still today, and that has always been the case for non-state actors to have an impact and an influence on decision making processes, being it NGOs or the private sectors. It's more effective to do it nationally.

Amy Westervelt: Could I have you talk a little bit about the efforts that are working to reveal this obstruction or oppose it, including your own work, this book, you know, academic research activism, journalism.

What are the things that are pushing back against this and do you see any that are particularly [00:46:00] effective?

Kari DePryck: Yes. So, so there has been quite a lot going on in the negotiations and also in the side events to try to name and shame in a way those actors who are obstructing negotiations, but also policy making nationally. And we can mention the  Notorious Fossil of the Day" that is being awarded by NGOs to some of the countries who have been obstructing the, the discussions. So that's, yeah, those, those kind of name and shaming, naming and shaming practices and strategies are being used a lot by civil society. What we see also, and obviously they, they provide this kind of really important moral dimension and moral argument in the negotiations is the fact that we also have a very active and influential [00:47:00] coalition of countries who are the most vulnerable to climate change. And here I'm thinking about the AOSIS, the Alliance of Small Island, developing states, which has been very active as well to kind of push for more ambitious action that has been also active in trying to bridge between different countries and developed and developing countries. And that, that's something that I find very interesting, which because it's initiative that brings together not only s countries is being pushed by them. But it also initiated also from discussions academic discussions, is this non-proliferation agreement on fossil fuel. And that's being discussed and increasingly also supported in the negotiations, which I find an interesting example of how to to build collaborations and support from different actors, being civil society, government [00:48:00] representatives, as well as researchers.

Amy Westervelt: We're coming up to the COP in Brazil, and I know Brazil came up in this chapter a couple times too. So I'm curious to hear what you think we can expect to see at this COP, what people should be looking for.

Eduardo Viola: The international situation in which this COP is going to happen is extremely difficult because of the new American administration. This is a major, major problem, but also is what I, I, I said before about the, the priority of national security. Today, how this affect all countries, eh, that has diminished the attention significantly to to climate change mitigation.

Okay? So this is a major obstacle for the convention for COP 30. And I would say that, so for [00:49:00] example, the one issue that is key in obstacle of the negotiation is the major difference of position between developing countries and developing countries, generally speaking. Okay? So this is a major obstacle, okay?

And there is for, from one side, there is less and less. Availability for financing from developed countries and from the other side, there is growing resentment in developing countries. I would say particularly in low income and low middle income countries in relation to the, to developing countries and to the, the credibility of the negotiation.

This is something is accumulating a lot. Okay. And it's, it's going to be more difficult this year, in my view. There are two things that are favorable in this. COP one is that the first one in a democratic country after three COPs in autocracies. So in the [00:50:00] environment of the COPs there is a diffuse influence of when you have a lot of, an atmosphere out of civil society mobilization that could be extremely intense in this case because Brazil is promoting the participation of civil society, national and international, even with all the vulnerability of Brazil, because has a good policy for controlling deforestation right now. But the land use change, but not about oil exploration. That is Brazil is becoming more and more one of the most important oil exported in the world. Okay, so this is the ambivalence or of the schizophrenia of the Lula administration. But anyway, it's from the Brazilian government is promoted and, and there is another thing that I think is relevant, and this is an uncertainty in my view, the uncertainty is what would be the [00:51:00] role of China in this convention?

Could China take advantage of the of the vacuum because there is no more European Union leadership. Okay? And United States is in the opposite side of the convention. So will China take advantage and change positions saying, okay, we recognize we are a global superpower, global economy superpower in all dimensions and we, cannot be considered anymore a developing country. We have many of the dimensions of developed country. Even if the per capita income is still in the high middle, income is not high, inc. I think, theoretically this could happen. There is a high probability of this to happen? [00:52:00] No, it's a low probability. But this, if there is a movement of China in that direction, whatever the specificities of this movement, this will create a new kind of environment in this scope that could diminish the negative situation of today, of the world and global climate policy.

And even could be very favorable for China, but because could, could reduce the opposition to China in democratic countries, because China is an autocracy. Okay? So there is, because theoretically because I don't have any inside information about China, okay? This, I think this could happen. The other thing that I think is important is what will be the role of the Brazilian president, not the Brazilian government behavior in the negotiation that will be like in any other country, but the Brazilian president, the, the most important goal of the [00:53:00] Brazilian pre president is securing the continuity of the negotiation.

It's a low ambition goal, okay? So, the danger is the implosion of the of COP. So this is our goal. Keep the COP going on. So for that, we need to have a very low ambition position in terms of hard matters, let's say. Okay. But we can create an atmosphere of discussion that is more forward thinking without entering in very tough issues in relation to emissions, for example.

But yes trying to, to say, how can I say that? For example, trying to circumvent, [00:54:00] try to avoid the deepening of the let's say of the risk of the.

Credibility by developing countries in

relation to something so.

Kari DePryck: I would really agree with Eduardo on the question of trust and the resentment, the lack of trust that we, we have seen in the last years. I was in, in Baku at Cop 29, I was also this June in Bonn. And the, the negotiation are stuck on several issues because of the disappointment of the new collective quantified goal on, on finance, which is seen as completely way too weak by developing countries.

And I think that's being a really big challenge for the Brazilian presidency to try to bring trust [00:55:00] between the countries, but also to, to try to have, to restore trust in the process.

Taking into account also that the United States pulled out that the EU is increasingly sometimes having very, like, having to take the same statements and kind of like obstructive a bit kind of positions that the US used to take, for instance, on finance and loss and damage. So I think it's going to be an important COP to try to talk about this question of trust and resentment and how to move forward in this new, very c