S14, Ep3 | The Psychology of Misinformation: Why Does It Work So Well?

Amy Westervelt: [00:00:00] Welcome back to Drilled. I'm Amy Westervelt, and over the next couple months I'm prepping to go to my very first COP! That stands for Conference of the Parties. It's an annual UN Climate Summit that brings together all the countries that are parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change or U-N-F-C-C-C.

It's true. I've been a climate reporter for more than 20 years and have somehow managed to avoid going to cop all this time. I'm going this year because it relates to a couple of projects we're working on for next year, and because the organizing committee from Brazil has vowed to make climate information integrity a focus of this year's gathering.

That's important because as we'll learn today, climate miss and disinformation is a huge part of the reason the world has not acted on this issue. I'm also curious to [00:01:00] get a front row seat because there's a real crisis of legitimacy happening with the COPs . This year is COP 30. That means they've been happening for 30 years and we don't seem any closer to a global solution to climate change than we were 30 years ago.

I'm also interested to see what happens when one of the world's biggest obstructors the United States, decides not to go, who will pick up the slack? Will it be Saudi? Yes, but also Japan. Even Europe, a lot of negotiators are heading into COP, wanting to protect their country's resources, their countries' approach to markets, all of those things.

So it will be interesting to see what [00:02:00] happens up close. And to get ready, I'm reading this new book from the Climate Social Science Network that pulls together everything we currently know about climate obstruction all over the world. It's great prep for this conference. I'm joined today by two researchers who look at how misinformation functions, why it's so effective, and what can be done to combat it.

John Cook is a senior research fellow with the Melbourne Center for Behavior Change at the University of Melbourne, researching how to use critical thinking to counter misinformation. You might have seen his research referenced in the past around the idea of tering, a misinformation technique that the oil companies love where you use.

Accurate bits of information assembled in such a way that they mislead people. Also joining us is Dominic Tela. He's an assistant professor of [00:03:00] Political Science at Colorado State University, whose research focuses on the information environment and its effects on society.

We talked about all sorts of things from the role ideology, polarization, and social media play in misinformation to concepts like solutions aversion and elite cues. That's coming up after this quick break. This is drilled season 14 obstruction.

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I'm sure you guys get asked this a hundred times a week, but I'm gonna ask you to do it again. Can I have you define the, the difference between misinformation and disinformation? And I think you make this really interesting point about the fact that like intentionality maybe doesn't matter so much here.

So I'd love to hear you say more about that [00:04:00] as well.

Dominik Stecula: In this literature on, on misinformation and disinformation, a lot of attention has been paid to intentionality, right? And the basic definition of misinformation is, is a false or misleading, uh, content that's shared without any intent to deceive. Um, whereas disinformation is shared with intent to deceive.

But, but what we say in the chapter is that, uh, on climate and, and really often in, in most other things, intent is, is unknowable, right? Sometimes. You, you, you get to know the intent through the release of private correspondence of a certain cable network, for example, right? But, uh, but in general, uh, in intent is unknowable and, and, uh, the same claim like volcanoes submit more CO2 than humans misleads audiences, regardless of, of whether the, the, the person sharing it wants to deceive or, or doesn't.

So, [00:05:00] so we think that it's better to focus on what these claims do, and what they do is they erode understanding and ultimately stall any meaningful climate action.

John Cook: And I would just add to that, um, that uh, when people believe misinformation, um, they will often make arguments that look exactly the same from the outside, using the same misleading techniques as people who are intentionally trying to deceive. And the reason for that is because when we are motivated to believe something, we gravitate towards these different biases. Uh, and for example, we might, uh, be biased towards believing certain types of information and that leads us to cherry pick data. So just pick, pick the bits of information that suit our beliefs and ignore all the information that contradicts our beliefs. So someone might be cherry picking because they're biased or they might be cherry picking 'cause they're intentionally trying to deceive [00:06:00] people. You don't know from the outside self-deception looks exactly the same as intentional deception from the outside.

Amy Westervelt: Right. Interesting. Okay. Um, can I have you define the elaboration likelihood model of attitude change and talk about how it shows up when we're talking about climate misinformation.

Dominik Stecula: So it's a big, uh, big theory in, in, in psychology and in in communications. And the gist of it is that we tend to process messages in, in different ways. Uh, sometimes it's, uh, via central route, and that's the careful evaluation. Uh, and we do that when we're motivated and, and able to, to really evaluate a claim, um, or the messages is processed through the peripheral route.

So things like shortcuts, like, you know, using a specific source, a vibe, quote unquote an identity. Uh, and we do that when we have limited time [00:07:00] or, or ability to really process and, and evaluate the claim. Since climate is a very complex issue, uh, most people tend to lean on, on the latter, on the peripheral route, on the shortcuts.

They don't really have frequently the ability and sometimes time to really process carefully that the claims, that's how ELM really pops up in the context of climate misinformation, because we tend to rely on this peripheral route on, on these shortcuts that we take mental shortcuts. Like who's saying things, what's the vibe, uh, the identity behind the speaker, or the identity that's triggered by the thing that's claimed.

So, so that's really the kind of the underlying basis for, for how this pops up in the broader context of climate misinformation.

Amy Westervelt: Yeah, I, um, I had never seen this before and it was really, really interesting for me, so I appreciate it. Um,

Dominik Stecula: similar to some of the, the kind of Danny [00:08:00] Kaman and, and the kind of thinking fast and slow, kind of cognitive, uh, you know, system one, system two, thinking it's, it's a similar, similar idea. Um, but yeah, that's, that's kind of, I think how I would, it's, there's obviously more to it than this, but that's how I would, I would, uh, kind of characterize where it fits in the context of what we're talking about.

Right? And a broad idea is that, let's say a 22nd clip from a politician you trust can outweigh an 800 word explainer because the clip hits this peripheral route, right? The identity, the emotion, uh, whereas the explainer demands a lot more cognitive effort that you might not have.

John Cook: And a lot of misinformation, arguments are superficially persuasive. They just, they just flow. They, they, they might have a logical fallacy, but they just, um, have a kind of a, a flow to it that, that sound, um, kind of [00:09:00] truthy to people.

Amy Westervelt: Yeah. Yeah. Um, public opinion comes up a lot in this, and obviously, um, you know, one of the. Key, maybe the key uses of misinformation is to shape public opinion, but, um, but I'd love to have you actually define what that means for people and then talk a little bit about how, um, climate misinformation works to sort of shape public opinion in, in one direction or another. Um, you mentioned this bottom up and top down, uh, approaches in the, in the paper too, and it'd be great to have you explain what that is.

John Cook: So, yeah, with public opinion, it, it can cover a couple of different things. Um, like one of the obvious things is people's perceptions about climate change. Do they think that climate change is happening and human cause and that the impacts will be bad? Uh, and we, we talk more specifically about those beliefs later in the chapter. But it [00:10:00] also extends to people's attitudes about climate action. Do they support policies to mitigate climate change? Do they support renewable energy? Uh, and so there's, there's that whole mix of perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes, and misinformation has several aims. Uh, it's about confusing people's perceptions about climate change, but ultimately it's about reducing public support for climate action.

Dominik Stecula: I, I'll just add maybe more, more just broader kinda meta as a, as a, as a, as a political scientist, you know, public opinion. It's this really important feature of, you know, democratic theory, right? And what we think of as, as, uh, what makes democratic society, um, actually democratic, right? And, and the idea is that this kinda aggregation of, of what people think and want, uh, should be reflected in what the, [00:11:00] the politicians do and the policies that, that, uh, the government ends up pursuing, right?

So though in, in many ways public opinion in, in, in theory at least, should be the driver, the, the push or stall of policy, and in the context of, of climate change, it, it definitely, uh, can stall it as well. Um, so. Misinformation in that context kind of tilts that playing field because it makes action harder, even when, uh, majorities support, uh, and believe in climate change and support certain kinds of climate action as we've seen in, in a lot of polling in, in the United States, but also in in other countries.

Um, in terms of the bottom up versus top down, um, uh, movements and, and, and pushing on, on public opinion. The idea is that, you know, in, in terms of bottom up, um, everyday [00:12:00] average people can share things they believe, uh, or, or, or, or, you know, they wrongly believed in terms of misinformed claims. Um, and, uh, because of how we structure our time and uh, kind of virtual spaces in which we tend to spend a lot of our time, uh, at using, you know, social media, et cetera.

Um. That bottom up pressure, you know, viral claims that are misinformed can really impact public opinion, right? When, when, when unchecked, uh, misinformation spreading on social media can really do a lot of damage. Um, so that's the bottom, bottom up component. The top down component is the elite. Uh, you know, and by elite I mean, I mean here, uh, politicians, um.

Interest groups, uh, of, of all kinds, including the fossil fuel, uh, industry. Um, they can [00:13:00] seed certain narratives and influence the public. Public, then public then repeats those claims. So the, the top down, bottom up dynamic is, is mutually reinforcing in, in, in many ways they, they, they reinforce each other, right?

Like a lot of the claims that quote unquote, organically show up on social media, um, have been supplied, uh, by, by, by elites, by interest groups, right? So, for example, a, in a context of climate misinformation, you can have a meme about, uh, EVs being dirtier than gas cars, and that might spread on social media.

Um, and it may appear to be something that's organic that, that people are just sharing among themselves. But, uh. Where did that come from? Where did it originate? Well, frequently, those types of tidbits, those type, those types of misinformed, uh, the misinformed, uh, content, uh, they originate with a lobbying group with, uh, with a specific [00:14:00] interest group that has a vested interest in spreading a certain narrative.

So, so in that sense, the, the kind of bottom up and top down influences of public opinion are mutually reinforcing because one feeds into another and, and then that pushes public opinion into, um, into places that is maybe, uh, less than ideal because, uh, it is based on information that is not truthful, not not correct, and ultimately, uh, deceiving.

Amy Westervelt: Okay, so, um, you talk about the, the fact that Americans aligned with the re with the Republican party are more skeptical now of climate science than they were in the 1990s. And, um, kind of use that as a jumping off point to talk about the role that ideology plays in shaping climate opinions. And, And, then you know, how climate misinformation kind of plays into that.

So I'd love to. Have you talk a little bit about ideology and just the role that it plays in climate [00:15:00] misinformation, which I realize, you know, you could probably spend two hours talking about

plus plus, but, um, but yeah, like how, I don't know, I guess Yeah. How does it work and, and why is it such a, um, an indicator of, of like how effective climate misinformation will be.

John Cook: in the psychology field, we talk about the concept of solutions aversion. Which is the idea that, uh, when people don't like a proposed solution to a problem, then they're more likely to deny that there's a problem in the first place. And we see this with climate change. Political conservatives often don't, they don't like some of the often proposed solutions to climate change, such as regulating fossil fuels, um, and, and trying to reduce emissions in that way. And so rather than coming up with their own free market solutions to climate change, instead, unfortunately, they, um, deny the, [00:16:00] the problem need solving. Uh, and so this is really the main driver why political ideology, uh, shapes people's climate opinions. And, and really back in the early 1990s, we were at this crossroad where the problem of climate change was becoming more, um.

A, a real, like the scientists were becoming clearer on the, the need to act on climate change and, and conservative groups ha really had this option where they could have either proposed conservative solutions to climate change or denied the problem. And it's a real historic tragedy that instead the conservative think tanks opted to deny the problem and produce misinformation.

And ever since then, misinformation has been polluting the information landscape and polarizing the public.

Dominik Stecula: Yeah, totally agree with everything John said. I mean, a few things I would add is [00:17:00] that when we think of. Ideology. Most people, at least in the United States, um, they are not consistently liberal or conservative right people. People can have views that are all over the place. Um, but increasingly in a polarized political landscape like ours, um, it is becoming, uh, the society is sorting along those partisan minds, uh, more and more so than than ever before.

Um, historically when, when you knew the fact that somebody is a liberal or conservative, you know, 40, 50 years ago that didn't really predict your ability to guess whether they're a Democrat or Republican, right? Uh, because there were, there were liberals and conservatives in both parties. Um, there were southern racist Democrats and there were northern kind of liberal.

[00:18:00] Republicans like Nelson Rockefeller to a certain extent, um, that no longer exists, right? The, the, the, the ideology and partisanship are sorted in the sense that if I now know that somebody identifies as a conservative, I have a pretty good guess that they also are a Republican. Uh, and same with, with, uh, liberals and, and Democrats.

And, and essentially ideology matters for climate views because partisanship, uh, and partisan polarization that kind of drives a lot of our politics these days. Climate is one of the issues on which parties have polarized. And that simply means that if you wanna be a member of good standing of the Republican party, um, you know that you need to be against climate action, right?

You need to be opposed to, you know, socialist leftists who wants to implement certain policies. [00:19:00] I'm obviously using air quotes here, which is not very useful, uh, tool to for, for radio. But, but, um, you know, that that's, that's, that's an axis of, of major division in, in society now in, in the United States.

And, and that is essentially translates to. This tribal way of thinking about climate because you know what's expected of people in your political tribe to believe. So any kinda thoughtful engagement with any kind of facts, et cetera, that that comes second to that. Right? When something becomes more of an identity than just a belief about a specific thing, it's much harder to change that, right?

Because it is part of a package of things that you choose to identify as. So ideology in that context is, is also, um. Troubling for climate views in the context of polarized American politics because ideology and partisanship are [00:20:00] very tied together now, and, and it's, it's one of those divisive things where the, where there's a lot less room for actual thoughtful debate now because it's one of those issues in which the public is polarized and you just know that if, if you're left or right, that's the view you're supposed to have.

End of discussion.

Amy Westervelt: Yeah. Yeah. Um, okay. Can you define for me elite cues and tell me about how they shape public opinion on climate change? What are these things? Thanks.

Dominik Stecula: I can say a few things since, uh, published on this, but essentially cues coming from trusted, uh, leaders. And in the context of climate change, we mostly mean, uh, leaders like politicians. And, you know, in, in given that, uh, American politics is so polarized and politics is an important part of how people [00:21:00] kind of see themselves messages coming from major political figures carry right, they're important because politics is important.

Uh, but it doesn't just mean politicians. It also means, uh, other trusted societal. For the lack of a better word, influencers, right? Like religious leaders, um, celebrities, et cetera. So elite cues would essentially be messages that come from trusted opinion sources that have the power to sway public opinion.

Um, they matter in the context of what we're talking about here because they not only can influence how your own team thinks about something, but they can also influence how the other team thinks. So one example being, um, the Inconvenient truth, um, the movie and, and Al Gore being a main [00:22:00] messenger when, when climate change really became a very salient issue in the early two thousands.

Al Gore, um. Was a trusted opinion leader for a lot of Democrats as a presidential candidate and a former two term vice president. But what we might now forget is that he was also a very disliked figure on the right. His, uh, his assessment on, uh, among Republicans in the United States was as negative as Hillary Clinton's in 2016, for example.

Right. He was a very polarizing figure, and the reason why I bring him up is that because he was the messenger, he obviously moved Democrats in a pro climate direction because he was a trusted leader on their side, but because he was so hated by the other side, he also moved Republicans. In the other direction [00:23:00] just because the, kind of the, the logic is if the person that you really hate says something, then you're just gonna almost by default do the opposite.

Right? And, and, and that's the power of elite cues in the sense that they can move, um, they can move your team, um, but they can also do some damage by, if you're choosing the wrong messenger, it can really backfire in a sense of making people really skeptical of what the content of the message is because the messenger is so distrusted and so disliked.

John Cook: And I'll just add to that, uh, a couple of studies have looked at what drives public opinion about climate change, looking at all the different factors such as economic factors, um, and, and elite cues. And they've found that elite cues are one of the biggest. Drivers of public opinion about climate change, which really underscores that people are tribal, as Dominic was saying earlier. And so when our tribal leaders, [00:24:00] um, giving us these cues in a certain direction, um, people, uh, tend to follow that.

Amy Westervelt: I actually was just listening earlier today to, um, to like old CSP span tape of, um, the head of the RNC at the time, um, during the Gore Bush election, like laying into to Gore who she happened. She was actually, you know, I Bruce Harrison's wife too, which is like a whole, a whole weird connection in and of, in and of itself.

Um, okay. And not a coincidence, I'm sure. Um, okay, so I wanna talk about the news media. Again, I feel like this, each of these topics could like be, you know, a whole long discussion in and of themselves, but, um, but in. In broad strokes, what role does the news media play in shaping public opinion, especially on climate And, um, and what has it done to [00:25:00] kind of either amplify or um, try to correct misinformation?

John Cook: So the media have, uh, in some cases, um, helped amplify or spread climate misinformation. And sometimes that's intentional. Sometimes it's unintentional. Uh, conservative media outlets have been a particularly, uh, as time has gone on, they've gotten worse at it, have been quite a, um, productive source of climate misinformation. Uh, and so that's, that's more of an intentional, uh, um, misleading the public kind of source. But you also have unintentional misinforming, such as when just mainstream media present climate change as a, as a false balance where they give both sides of an issue equal weight, uh, which is entirely appropriate when it's issues of political opinion or um, policy. But [00:26:00] when it comes to issues where there's a scientific consensus. Then presenting like a 50 50 debate between a scientist and a climate denni just has a misinforming effect. So I mean, we were talking at the beginning about misinformation and disinformation and how difficult it is to tell the difference between the two. We see that with how media have covered climate change too, whether it's intentional or not. Um, there are these different ways of misinforming the public.

Dominik Stecula: Yeah, the, the false balance that John's referring to, um, the, the norm in a lot of newsrooms and, and the profound fear of being seen as biased leads to certain types of coverage that, that, like John highlighted, is not ideal in the context of a scientific issue. I think the, the problem with a lot of the, how the media inclu, including nonpartisan media, so I'm not even talking [00:27:00] now about, uh, certain cable news networks or explicitly partisan sources of information, but, but just your run of the mill mainstream news sources outside of even just the false balance, which, which is wrong and, and should be avoided.

The, the what, what has happened is that increasingly, as the public has polarized on this issue. The issue is presented more as a political one than a scientific one. Um, I've done, uh, a big study with, with content analysis of climate change coverage, looking at decades of, of climate change and, and global warming news, uh, in American media starting in the, uh, in the nineties and going, going in into 2016.

And, and what has happened is, uh. Experts are featured prominently, which is good, but increasingly they share the space with [00:28:00] politicians. And a lot of coverage includes, um, references and quotes from politicians. And the moment politicians kind of crowd out the experts to people on the receiving end to the news consumers, it just becomes a partisan issue and not a scientific issue.

So, so in that sense, it, it isn't just a false balance of, oh, we, we, we need to, uh, present this issue in a quote unquote balanced and fair way. We don't want to be called, uh, you know, partisan hacks. So we're gonna have a pro climate change and an anti-climate change person on. Even beyond that, the sheer fact that the volume of.

Of, of poli politicians in the climate change coverage, uh, has helped to polarize the public and make it an issue where, uh, to be a good member, uh, to be a member in good standing of, of the, [00:29:00] uh, of a certain political party. You need to have a specific political position on that issue.

Amy Westervelt: Yeah, I, um, I mean, I've been a reporter for a long time and I keep seeing this in amongst a lot of climate reporters right now. Especially like, um, I don't know, like I, I feel like at least in the US people have moved away somewhat from the false equip. Lens thing, but there's this, this, um, kind of archetype of a, of reporter who I think thinks it makes them seem smarter if they are like more open to industry talking points, you know?

Um, like it makes them, I don't know. I don't know. Anyway, it's, it's very annoying.

John Cook: academia as well. Oh

Amy Westervelt: Oh, great. Great. Amazing. Uh, it's really, I don't know. I find it, I find it very annoying. Um, yeah. Okay. So actually you mentioned academia and um, I know that's not a [00:30:00] specific focus in this chapter, but

kind of tying into elite cues and some of the news media stuff in general too.

I wonder how much, um, kind of using acade like academics, especially at really, um, elite universities, helps with pushing climate misinformation, um, to various publics as well. Yeah, it's an is like that messenger for, for, these guys,

John Cook: That's an interesting question. Uh, uh, so from 2017 to 2020, I was based at George Mason University in Virginia

and George John?

John. Exactly, yes. Uh, so, you know, you gotta, you gotta change from within, right? That was,

Amy Westervelt: Yeah.

John Cook: that's the thing. And so George Mason is really ground zero for the, where the Koch brothers have tried to spread their influence through academia and universities. So the Koch brothers are, um, [00:31:00] uh, basically the fossil fuel industry. Like they're incredibly rich, incredibly influential, and playing a very impressive, long game in terms of influencing not just public opinion, but, uh, influencing universities and, and thought and, and then, and then that going on to influence, um, elites, political elites and, and the public as well.

So, so, and this has been a strategy. Going over decades. Uh, and, and it's been quite effective in terms of influencing the public towards their, um, not only their political beliefs, but also casting doubt on climate change.

Dominik Stecula: And I would add to it the growing strain of, uh, populism as we, uh, document in the chapter we have the whole case study of, of Brazil, but in general, just populism and, and anti intellectualism essentially [00:32:00] means that increasingly even the experts themselves are not a very, uh, trusted group for a certain segment of the population.

Uh, so when we talk about elite cues, um, you know, the, the academic expert, uh, queue, uh, might be useful for a lot of. Uh, people. Uh, but for some it might be a polarizing one. Um, because they view, uh, uh, academics, researchers as, as the, out, as the outgroup, right? They view them as, as the enemy. So why on earth would, would you trust somebody who, who is, uh, who is, uh, an outgroup and who doesn't have, uh, your and your country's best interests in, in heart, right?

Like, which is, I mean, the, the, like, vice President JD Vance literally said that professors are the, the enemy, right? [00:33:00] So, so, so in that sense, that makes messaging, Harvard guy calls Harvard guys the enemy. Yeah.

Exactly. Uh, so, so it is, it is, uh, it is a very tricky landscape now, right. Because in, in that sense, even, even, uh, expertise alone and, and credentials are being challenged in order to, to sow doubt and, and divide.

Amy Westervelt: yeah. Yeah. I know. I was reading this and I sent, um, a snippet of it to my husband because the, my sister-in-law is like this. She is like super anti, um, any kind of like, expert, I don't know any kind of experts, people with advanced degrees.

She calls, um, she refers to them as educationalists.

Um, Yeah. So she would not be a huge, uh, huge fan of, of me and John. Okay. That's good to know.

I know

it's really. to [00:34:00] avoid Amy's sister. Yeah.

Yeah, it's amazing. It's really like some of the stuff that, um, that she says, I'm like, wow, where's this coming from? Mostly Facebook is the answer.

Um, Yes.

yeah, so actually that's something that, um, that you highlight in this chapter too, and, you know, I think, like we all know that it's gotten worse with social media, but, um, but can you talk a little bit about just how much worse and how quickly and, um, and maybe even like.

I don't know. I, I feel like you get at this in a couple different ways in the chapter, but it, it, um, it's not just that social media has changed, you know, the infrastructure for information to move, but it's also changed, like, uh, how people think about information. You know.

um, how they, I don't know, like how, maybe how susceptible they are to climate misinformation.

Um, yeah. So what are some of the key things to look, [00:35:00] look out for there?

Dominik Stecula: So, I mean, social media is. Important, uh, because it is where most people get their information and spend a lot of their time. Now, uh, you know, traditional media, um, still matters. So not to say that, that people, uh, that, that, you know, people don't watch cable or don't watch evening news or don't read the newspaper, but their power, uh, is waning considerably.

And what we have instead is, you know, this very fragmented information landscape that, uh, includes all kinds of, uh, forms of delivering information. I mean, podcasts are big now, right? And, and some of the most important ways in which people get informed now, uh, and, and one that's, uh, growing in, in, in, uh, important.

Our, our podcast and, and you know, that's when [00:36:00] we see, uh, people like Joe Rogan, who have tremendous power and, and, and sway over, uh, people, not just in the United States, but all over the world. Um, and, and we have social media where, you know, people get to interact and see things in, in real time. And, uh, it's becoming very difficult to, um, consume news in a, in a way as, as a news consumer.

You're, your, your essentially, your job has gotten a lot harder over the years because if you just wanted to get reliable information 20, 30 years ago, you could just subscribe to a newspaper, uh, maybe a magazine, right? You would listen to, to like NPR or something. Uh, you had a few sources that, you know, uh, all, uh, adhere to.

Journalistic principles and, uh, delivered for the most part pretty, pretty [00:37:00] healthy information diet to you. Uh, now to curate that space for you is incredibly difficult because on social media, it, the burden falls on you to make, uh, a timeline on Facebook or on, on, uh, Twitter, uh, now x uh, uh, on, on TikTok to, to, to to control what you see and to, to create a space for you, uh, for yourself that is full of content that is coming from, uh, professionals who, who you trust, their kind of information gathering strategies, et cetera, right?

It's just very difficult for you to do, even if you want to be a responsible news consumers. It, it, it is a very tremendously difficult thing to do. And even if you try to spend time doing this, a lot of what you see. Isn't just what you want to see, right? Like it's not just the accounts you follow, A lot of it is algorithmically driven.

The algorithm is a black box, and [00:38:00] it's serving you content that is not necessarily having your best interests in mind, right? So I think social media are best understood in that space as. Uh, a place where misinformation can spread very, very fast and unchecked and can do a lot of damage before anybody can really do anything about it.

And that's assuming they wanna do something about it. Which, you know, uh, now, uh, what we know about major social media companies, uh, with, with Donald Trump, uh, in a, again, in the White House, uh, they're, they're previously held positions of trying to, to fact check and, and, and maybe, uh, halt the spread of this information.

Those commitments are no longer there, right? So, so it is a very difficult, I think, for you as a news consumer to, uh, to just operate in, in, out in the world right now because it's very time consuming. It's very difficult to curate a space [00:39:00] for yourself. Uh, and, uh, it's, it's really, it's really hard. Um.

Amy Westervelt: Yeah. No, it really is. I know we, I, um, I, I had an intern this summer. Very smart young woman. Pretty savvy news Consumer wanted to work for a climate news organization and like in our first conversation she told me that she exclusively gets her news from this one newsletter on Substack. And I looked up the guy who does it, and he's just, he's like a policy and PR guy, you know? Like he's not, she's like, yeah, sometimes he like, often gets news stories out even before, you know, the major newspapers. And I said, well, yeah, 'cause he is not doing any reporting or fact checking.

So it's pretty fast, have been worse though. Could have been worse. Could have been some guy on TikTok, right? could have been, it could have been. I know. So, yeah, it's not even like, oh, you know, I don't know, like dumb, [00:40:00] uneducated people are getting their news that way. Everybody, like everybody is really doing it. John, I know you've like, you know, worked with these companies and stuff too. Um, so curious to hear your thoughts as well.

John Cook: Um, it, it feels like a, a lifetime ago now, but I did do some work with Facebook on fact checking climate misinformation back when they cared about that. So I think the people I worked with and are no longer even there, but, or at least that whole department seems to have been disappeared. But, um, but what we were doing was, um, like, like the, well, the impression I got from working with Facebook was that they were concerned about the perception that they were allowing misinformation to spread on their platform and that, so they were being pushed in these different directions.

There, there was. Uh, conservative politicians that were, you know, bullying Zuckerberg in, in public hearings about, um, censoring climate misinformation as they put it. [00:41:00] Uh, and then there was a lot of people, um, criticizing them for letting misinformation spread. So they were trying to thread this path of least controversy, which I thought was interesting.

And, and the one way that they tried to manage it was by publishing the, what they call the Climate Change Information Center. Um, I haven't even checked to see whether it's still online now, but, um, and the idea there was promote facts about climate change, but also they, they were debunking some climate myths and, and myself and a few other, um, scientists who work on debunking were, were helping them write those. So it was, it was an interesting experience. Like, um, it was good that they were at least trying something and we would, we were constantly. Pressuring them to try to go further. Uh, but I, what I learned from that is that these corporations are not a single monolith, but there's lots of forces within them all tugging in different directions.

And so, um, it that made often it was a case of two steps forward, one step back.

Amy Westervelt: Yeah. [00:42:00] Yeah. I wanna have you walk me through this typology of disinformation susceptible, disinformation, susceptible Publix. Um, I found this really useful too, this way of thinking about the different groups of people. Um, so yeah. Could I have you rattle that off please?

John Cook: Yeah. So the typology is really a spectrum. So, uh, at one end of the spectrum, you have people who are immune to climate misinformation. So if they hear some misinformation on Twitter or, or X or, or wherever they'll, you know, they'll see it for what it is. Uh, and these people tend to be fairly knowledgeable about climate change so that they. They are, uh, less prone to being misled. Uh, then along the spectrum you have people who are vulnerable to misinformation, uh, and people who are receptive. These are the two groups in the middle, and this is most people. So these people are less knowledgeable about climate change and more susceptible to being persuaded by [00:43:00] misinformation. Uh, and then at the, the other end of the spectrum, you have disinformation amplifiers. So these people are small in number, but they're often the loudest voices. So they have a disproportionate influence. So you have at the end of the spectrum the people who are more knowledgeable, um, in one way or the other.

But then in the middle you have the people who are less knowledgeable and tend to be more vulnerable. And the consequence of, or the usefulness of having this kind of typology is it can help inform communication strategies. Uh, and often it's about. Buttressing, the people in the middle who are vulnerable, like helping them building their climate literacy or building their critical thinking and their immunity against misinformation.

Dominik Stecula: I would add just one thing, um, because that ties into the previous question about social media, but like John said, most people are not the [00:44:00] amplifiers, but we frequently, uh, have this perception that they are, and that's partly because of those people, frequently are the ones who have mastered. Uh, the social media and, and what gets rewarded by the algorithm and what, what doesn't.

And, and, you know, I I also study vaccine hesitancy because, uh, I'm a masochist apparently. And, and this is really, uh, something that we see in that space as well. Um, you know, the, that those amplifiers, those highly motivated, very extreme, um, these folks, they, they're just very loud voices of a small minority, but they tend to take over the conversation because of how our information environment looks.

And I think it's really useful to take a step back and think of the other people in the spectrum. As, as John mentioned, that's a lot more people are there.

Amy Westervelt: Yeah. Yeah. So you mentioned these five key beliefs about climate change that [00:45:00] surveys have pinpointed, and conversely these like five mirror images, um, around misinformation, can I have you lay those out as well? What are these kind of key beliefs? And there are opposites that, um, that we're seeing.

John Cook: So the five key beliefs about climate change were originally developed by Ed Mayback, who happened to be my boss when I was based at George Mason University. Uh, and he did a lot of psychological research into how people think about climate change. And found that, uh, through his survey work, he identified these five, uh, key beliefs. Uh, and he sums 'em up very partly in just 10 words. It's real, it's us. It's bad. Experts agree there's hope. So it's about, uh. It's about, um, believing that climate change is real, it's happening. Humans are causing it. The impacts will be bad. The climate scientists, the experts agree on these scientific points, but there is hope that we can solve [00:46:00] climate change. And, and, and again, like what it Maybach does is, um, based on these five beliefs, it helps inform communication strategies and you can design fairly simple messages to, to, just, um, boost these five beliefs. Uh, I've noticed that since we wrote this chapter and submitted it, um, ed Mayback has updated it now.

Now it's, he calls them six key truths about climate change. And the sixth addition is, um, people agree or something like that. That, um, because there's a common misconception that people don't, um. Uh, concerned about climate change, whereas in reality, the, the majority of the public in the US and and globally are concerned that they are on board about climate change, uh, mirroring, um, what both Dominic and I were saying earlier, that the disinformation amplifies us, you know, a tiny minority. [00:47:00] Um, the, they're like about 10% of the US public, um, whereas more than half of the US public are concerned or alarmed about climate change. So that's the, that's, uh, I guess what Ed has identified as another important, um, truth or percept.

Amy Westervelt: Yes. I found this so interesting in your research that because the amplifiers are loud and because there's this belief that no one else cares, it has a silencing effect on people who otherwise might talk more about climate. I've seen this happen with media too. It has an effect there as well where if people call in or email newsrooms, a lot of times the head of the newsroom thinks that that means, okay, there must be 10, 20, 50, even a hundred other people who feel this way and just didn't take the initiative to reach out.

So it really has a big impact on how stuff gets covered. 'cause they take that as being a signal from the audience.

John Cook: And yeah, that's a really important [00:48:00] dynamic and one of those more subversive impacts of misinformation. We tend to think of Misinformations main impact is that it just causes people to believe wrong things, but it can have a range of impacts. Um, such as reducing trust in scientists or institutions. And, and this is one of the bigger ones, is, is this mis misconception, which psychologists call pluralistic ignorance. The fact that we are ignorant, that people concerned about climate change are the majority. And when we have this misconception of pluralistic ignorance, it has a silencing effect which causes this spiral of silence where when no one's hearing anyone else talk about it. So we all tend to stay silent. And the, the real world implication of that is that it reduces the social momentum that we need to get climate action. Uh, and that's, you know, that's quite a damaging impact.

Amy Westervelt: Climate change [00:49:00] misinformation has shifted in the last 10 years or so, what would you say are the four major arguments found in climate misinformation

today? Yeah. So, um, some colleagues have. That I worked with based in the UK and Ireland. Uh, we, um, we developed an AI model to track climate misinformation, arguments and, and built a 20 year history of, of what are the ebbs and flows of climate misinformation. And we found this long term 20 year trend where misinformation was gradually transitioning away from the science denial and more towards attacking climate solutions. Um, and so we see that climate solutions, misinformation is really the future of what climate misinformation is going to be increasingly focused on. And, and, and that's what the discourses of delay are. So those are the. The argument's designed to delay climate action. And, and the four, um, main arguments that we identify in the chapter [00:50:00] is, um, firstly that overall argument that, um, climate change can't be solved.

John Cook: It's that it's the opposite of the, there's hope, climate belief. It's saying there's no hope. Um, then there's, uh, emphasizing the downsides of, of climate action. So that's, and we hear this argument a lot, not only in climate change, but also we heard a lot during the pandemic actually the argument that the cure is worse than the problem. Um, the third MA major argument we identified was redirecting responsibility for climate change to others. Uh, and I think the fossil fuel industry have actually done a really, um, clever, effective job in trying to shift the blame for climate change away from themselves to individuals. Uh, saying you as an individual have to solve climate change. Uh, and you not many people know that the first carbon footprint calculators were funded by the fossil fuel industry. They were trying [00:51:00] to, um, get us thinking about our individual carbon footprint to, so that we weren't thinking about trying to transition away from fossil fuels. It has a silence.

Dominik Stecula: Right. It's, it's a, a fossil fuel company saying, you know, we're planting trees while they're lobbying against emission rules. Right. What are you doing? Right? Yeah.

John Cook: and, and that's really the fourth argument we identify in the chapter, which is advocating solutions that really don't, uh, aren't the main thing that we need. Um, such as like we, you know, we do need to reduce our individual footprint, but that's only going to get us a tiny part of the way. The real solution is transforming the way we. Get our energy. Uh, and so, um, I, I think another example of that is, is promoting gas methane gases as a bridge to, uh, renewables. That's just another way of delaying the action, kicking the [00:52:00] can further down the road. Um, and, and the fact that it's called natural gas, like that's how they brand themselves is, is just a, another form of greenwashing.

It's, it's a way of making them portraying themselves as this natural, um, cleaner form of energy when it's still just a fossil fuel.

Amy Westervelt: Yeah, absolutely. Can I have you explain what the Flick framework is and how we can use it to understand climate misinformation?

John Cook: so flick comes out of, um, the psychological research into how do we build public resilience against misinformation. And one of the ways to do that is by, um. Inoculating people, um, by explaining the techniques used to mislead. Once people understand the logical fallacies and the misleading rhetorical techniques in misinformation, they're less likely to be misled. So Flick, [00:53:00] um, was developed as a what as a framework for just helping people remember the misleading techniques. Um, they stand for fake experts, logical fallacies, impossible expectations, cherry picking and conspiracy theories, which are five of the main, uh, denial techniques. Not use, use, not just in climate change, but across all areas of science. Um, uh, Dominic mentioned being a masochist and working on vaccine hesitancy.

We see the flick techniques. Yeah, we see those techniques in vaccine misinformation, just the same as climate misinformation.

Amy Westervelt: I mean, it definitely seems like the erosion of trust in experts and science that happened as a result of decades of climate misinformation

set us up for a lot of the mis info that we saw during the pandemic.

John Cook: absolutely. Um, I've, the, like, climate misinformation has been happening for decades, since the, the early [00:54:00] 1990s. And it's just been creating this fertile ground for, um, for building distrust of scientific institutions and not just climate scientists, but science more generally. So that when we came around to the pandemic, um, the, the playbook was there, like what happened over like a six to 12 month period, uh, during the pandemic was like a compressed version of the last few decades of climate misinformation using all the same techniques, even the same people were involved, like climate deniers were also, um, then, uh, promoting vaccine misinformation. So, uh, it's, it's all kept from the same

Amy Westervelt: We kind of talked about this, um, silencing effect already, but I wanna have you talk about it a little bit more. You know, any other kinds of silencing that happen when. And um, I guess when, yeah, when people are

John Cook: move, hearing all [00:55:00] these misleading messages,

Amy Westervelt: you know, thinking that everyone else doesn't really care, all those kinds of things, what are the other kind of society Well another thing we talk about in the chapter that we haven't covered yet in this conversation is the silencing or the chilling effect it might have on the scientific community. So scientists are humans too.

John Cook: Surprise, surprise. And, and when people are, when a community is, is being bombarded with stereotype attacks, then just even without themselves realizing it, they tend to behave in a way that tries to avoid that stereotype. So when climate scientists are being attacked for being alarmists, um, then they tend to downplay the alarming results in their scientific research, uh, to avoid that perception of being an alarmist.

And so we, there's been studies that have found that climate scientists tend to err [00:56:00] on the side of Lee Drama, trying to downplay the more alarming, uh, results in their research.

Dominik Stecula: And there's a fair amount of, uh, harassment that. Many people experience as well. Um, you, you, you mentioned Amy, the, the people who, who would call in, um, you know, they write, they write emails too. They, they send physical mail. Uh, I personally have gotten things mostly in relation to my work, uh, on, on vaccine hesitancy.

I think vaccine like, uh, vaccine, uh, Hess, uh, anti-vaxxer folks tend to be very motivated and they, they really push back. Uh, but, but I, I've heard stories from, from from colleagues working in, in the climate space as well. So, so it frequently also means actual harassment, which, which isn't very pleasant. Uh, but, um, going back to your initial.

Original question. It, it, it isn't [00:57:00] just misleading people, right? It, it then reshapes institutions. So, like John said, that it will reshape the institution of science because maybe scientists will speak differently or maybe they'll, uh, they won't engage in public as much with their work as, as they would've done otherwise.

Um, it re uh, reshapes institutions and, and policy because, uh, uh, it enables, you know, greenwashing and all these other things that John mentioned in, in the previous answer. Um. So, so I think when you, when you zoom out, what, what this tells us is, is that it's not just specific pieces of misinformation and how it impacts public opinion per se.

Um, it's not just about the audience level, it's also about the system level guard guardrails that we need to have in place. Right? Uh, and I think a lot of this is [00:58:00] highlighted in, uh, in the case study that we have in a chapter, uh, written by our, uh, written by our colleague, uh, um, Jean Carlos Miguel, who, who, who wrote the case study on, on, on digital populism and, and President Bolsonaro in Brazil, where these, uh, these climate misinformation, um, actions where, uh.

Trans transitioning entire, um, institutions within the government of Brazil. Um, so it didn't just impact specific people, it impacted how actual governmental agencies are run, how they're staffed, um, what they do, um, and, and uh, that then impacted not just what's happening in Brazil, but, but you know, what they did on an international, uh, stage and, and obstructing climate talks, et cetera.[00:59:00]

So, so it shows you how, how those narratives, uh, have the power to, to reshape entire institutions. Right. And I think that the line that, that, uh, Jean Carlos had in, in our case study was in Brazil, am mean, became a ministry memo. And it really kind of captures, I think, what has happened, right?

John Cook: Uh, and I, I think what's happening in the US now is particularly interesting. Um, the, the, that issue of the, like misinformation influence seeping into the scientific community, that concept of seepage, uh, was, we were drawing on a lot of the work of Stefan Lewandowski, who's a researcher in Bristol. And he also has written about the subterranean war on science, which has been this kind of a quiet, almost hidden war of harassment or, or bullying of, of academics. Uh, and a lot of it [01:00:00] has been. Um, and, and I'm sure this is the case with, with, like Dominic was talking about being harassed often, uh, US academics will, will be pressured or, or bullied, but it's kind of hidden really. Um, a lot of it, but now it's open. It's, it's like we've gone from a cold war to a hot war and, and in the US the, the War on climate Sciences is overt now where, um, research is being defunded, climate information or just even mentions of climate are being stripped from government websites. Uh, and it's, it's just a lot more overt, um, this hostility and, and trying to undermine climate science.

Amy Westervelt: Okay. Can I have you please explain why correcting misinformation isn't enough and, and since it's not, what would be enough to combat this problem, or at least start to.

John Cook: Yeah, we've talked a lot about motivation, um, and when people [01:01:00] are. Motivated to reject information, to reject the facts, then fact checking can struggle to be effective with, with those types of people. So, so fact checking I think is necessary, but insufficient. Like we do need to push back against misinformation, but it's, it's not, it's not the whole answer and it won't work in all cases. Uh, so we, we do need a range of solutions. Um, and one of them we've already discussed, which is, uh, inoculating people against the misleading techniques of misinformation. The psychology research shows that, that approach that, um, we call it technique based inoculation or, or logic based inoculation. Sorry to get all jargony on you, but, um, uh, that approach works across the political spectrum. Nobody likes being misled, whether they're conservative or liberal. So explaining the techniques used to mislead, um, can help neutralize. [01:02:00] Polarizing climate misinformation, uh, across the spectrum. Uh, the other thing we discuss, which is, uh, a lot more challenging, but really important is making systemic changes to make misinformation harder to spread. Uh, this was the kind of thing that I was advocating for Facebook to do, to, to build into their algorithms systems to make it harder for misinformation to spread. And, and they were quite resistant against it. So I think that it's a very difficult thing to achieve, but, um, we need to keep, uh, working to try to make those happen.

Amy Westervelt: Use this term in the book that I'd never heard and I love it. So I wanna end on having you define it for us. What is jujitsu persuasion?

John Cook: yeah. The idea was proposed by Matt Hoey, who's a, a colleague at the University of Queensland here in Australia. And the idea, like with Jiujitsu, it's about, it's like using your opponent's weight, uh, um. Like working with their, their momentum rather than trying to push [01:03:00] back against it. Uh, and the idea in a communication context is that rather than present scientific misinformation in a way that threatens people's motivations, beliefs, identity, um, present instead the science information in a way that, um, that aligns with people's motivations or identities. So, so you try to work with it rather than against it. So I'll, I'll give you a tangible example then. Uh, and this actually comes back to that idea of solutions aversion that I talked about way at the beginning. So there was a study that found that, um, they they presented climate change information in two ways. Um, the climate science information was exactly the same in both ways, but it's, uh, in one message they said climate change is real, therefore we need to, um. Uh, regulate the fossil fuel industry. Uh, in the other [01:04:00] message they said, climate change is real. Therefore, we need to, um, promote the nuclear industry. And they found that amongst Republicans, they hated the first message, regulate the fossil fuel industry. No way. But they, uh, were much more, um, welcoming of the nuclear industry message. And so their attitude about climate change was vastly different depending on the message. The scientific information presented was exactly the same, but the solution was different. One threatened their, um, ideology and the other affirmed it.

Amy Westervelt: That's it for this time.

Make sure you're subscribed so you don't miss an episode. You can find more on this season, including transcripts and lots of related articles and background information on our website at drilled.media. You can also sign up for our newsletter there.

Our producers for this season are Martin Zaltz Austwick and Peter [01:05:00] Duff. Our theme song is Bird in the Hand By Foreknown.

Our cover art is done by Matthew Fleming. Our First Amendment attorney is James Wheaton with the First Amendment Project. The show was created, written and reported by me, Amy Westervelt.

Thanks for listening and see you next time.