S14, Ep8 | Climate Obstruction in the Global South

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Amy Westervelt: Hello and welcome back to Drilled. I'm Amy Westervelt. This season we are making our way through the book Climate Obstruction, a global survey.

I'm getting ready to head to the annual UN Climate Summit, the COP or conference of the parties in November, and to prep for it. I am reading up on all of the research so far about climate obstruction and how it works around the world. In today's episode, a really important topic, especially for this year's COP, which is how climate obstruction works in the Global South, and how some of these structures in place continue to privilege Global North countries over Global South countries when we're talking about climate negotiations, which then makes it that much harder to even talk about climate policy in the Global South without it seeming like something that is patently unfair.

Joining me to talk about this today are two leading experts on this question. They oversaw a chapter in this book that pulls together all the research that we have so far on it. Ruth McKie from De Montfort University and Omar Faruque at Queen’s University in Canada.

Our conversation is coming up after this quick break.

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Amy: So I'm gonna ask you a really, really dumb basic question, and that is, please define Global South for us. Let's set the context here.

Ruth McKie: That basic question is probably a very big question. So I think for us, setting it out into the context of this [00:02:00] chapter, we see the Global South in its geopolitical sense. So it's a group of countries that have a history of colonialism, neo imperialism, and so that historical context of non-Western nations that now sit within a very different economic and social structure to western nations that really it's driven by political and economic marginalization, which then in turn has implications, at least for us in our case, how it then stands with addressing climate, the climate crisis. So we can't see the global south and global south countries as this one complete same [00:03:00] picture set of countries.

Rather it's a reflection of the geopolitical history in which we've distinguished between western global north countries and then non-Western countries in the global south. So I think that's the best way that we've come to define the global south and how we deploy it in this chapter.

Amy Westervelt: Okay, so you talk about these five major considerations when we're looking at climate obstruction in the global south, and I wanna talk about all five of them, but, but let's start with, what you were just talking about, Ruth, that like these, you know, there's a lot of very different countries in, in different regions of the world that are in this category of global south.

So, that means that they have varying commitments and there are varying commitments even within the countries. Can you talk about those contrasts and how they play out both [00:04:00] within the countries and sort of beyond them and between them.

Omar Faruque: Okay, so I'll, I'll, I'll pick this up. So here we are referring to the, variations in climate commitments among countries in the global south. And, we see that these countries, as Ruth mentioned, given the fact that we are looking at these countries from the vantage point of, history of colonialism, new colonialism and imperialism and their positions in global political economic order, we , see these countries' experience, shared experience in terms of disadvantages in terms of economic growth, development, prosperity, and human development.

So a common thing among all these countries is that they are in a disadvantageous situation in terms of economic growth and development and that, shapes [00:05:00] their commitment to climate action, their commitment to fulfilling their pledge, their commitment to the Paris Accord. So such disadvantages we see creating, these variations in terms of commitment. Take for example African countries. We can consider all those countries together in one category. For them, climate action is, is not a priority. Decarbonizing the economy is not a priority for them. It is energy poverty, addressing energy poverty reaching electricity to to its population.

It's something that is their priority and suddenly they will consider any sort of options to to fulfill that goal. So, when energy poverty as a result of their disadvantageous situation in terms of economic growth, prosperity, and human development is a major concern than climate action or commitment to climate [00:06:00] pledge is something that takes a backseat. We can also think about the case of India. India is a giant economy in current times, but it still considers energy, poverty, human development associated with this as is primary concern because millions of people, hundreds of millions of people in that country they do not have access to energy.

So energy poverty, energy security and disadvantages economic situation is something that is causing varying commitments to climate actions in many countries in the global south.

Amy Westervelt: It's been interesting to see the big oil majors really pick up on specifically energy poverty in Africa as like they're, you would think that they're all just charities trying to solve it. But they talk about it all the time.

Omar Faruque: Yeah. I'll, I'll just add one thing here. Carbon majors are expressing interest in many African [00:07:00] countries to explore and develop their untapped resources by mentioning this issue of energy poverty, energy security. But there is also another layer of it, and that is the interest of countries in the global north, especially European countries, which are now facing an existential threat coming from cutting off gas from Russia.

So they have to find out alternative sources and they have found with their, with the assistance of their carbon majors, some, some African countries as, as a source to fill that void.

Amy Westervelt: yeah. Yeah. I asked a a fossil fuel executive recently if they were planning to invest in grid infrastructure in Mozambique to, as part of their energy poverty plan. And they were like. What

Omar Faruque: Because

most of, most of these are exported to, will be exported

Amy Westervelt: Yeah, of course. They'll be

Omar Faruque: Yeah. So Ghana for example, it'll [00:08:00] export all major part of these developed fossil gas to Europe. So they are not in a position like carbon measures are not in a position or not to make any commitment to do anything locally.

Amy Westervelt: Right, so it is, it's often said that and obviously there's a lot of evidence to this effect as well, that, you know, global south countries contributed the least to climate change, but will face the impacts first and worst. Can you talk about how that plays into climate obstruction?

Omar Faruque: That's an interesting thing that we observed in our, in our analysis of climate actions and climate delay or obstruction in the global south. The issue of least responsibility is something that is used most often than not by politicians, political elites, and even civil society groups– environmentalists noted [00:09:00] environmentalists to to sort of justify climate delay if not climate obstruction. We, in, in this case, we are very careful in choosing our words. So, and, and, and that is also connected to the notion of climate justice. So it comes from that original 1992 UN triple C climate agreement where this notion of differentiated common, but differentiated responsibilities came in.

So the global north, the contributed overwhelmingly to, to, historical carbon emissions. So they created this sort of mess or climate crisis is now up on their shoulder to take the major responsibility to clean it up. And and that is by by reducing their emissions as well as providing technical and financial support to global south countries to, to first adapt to [00:10:00] climate crisis.

And then. Also contributing to sort of mitigation, transitioning towards green energy, all sorts of things. So the, the, the notion of least responsibility, historically least responsibility, is something that we, we, we find as a, as a kind of justification for, for delaying climate actions or, or even undertaking bold climate actions in many countries in the global south, many big countries India's name comes to our mind because India is in, in, in recent years in global even climate meetings, India is kind of, playing the role of a leader of the global south in advocating for them using the framework of climate justice. Climate fairness, all sorts of things. So, we find such emphasis, on least responsibility is a major [00:11:00] factor contributing to sidelining climate actions or delaying climate actions in many countries in, in, in, in the global south. And I would also add one particular point, least re the notion of least responsibilities is not just that sideline commitment towards greenhouse gas mitigation reducing their emission.

It directs our, their attention to most of their time, energy, and attention to building resilience and developing adaptation measures. So they're focused on least responsibility. Takes all energy and resources and attention towards adaptation and resilience. And we also see how that plays out during global climate negotiations. Global south countries call for climate finance contribution equally for mitigation and adaptation and [00:12:00] resilience. Currently, global north countries are interested in investing in mitigation, not much in terms of adaptation and resilience. So global south countries invoke these notion of climate justice least responsibilities to intervene into that that financial arrangements equally divided between mitigation and adaptation.

Ruth McKie: I think that goes to the problem that stands in the idea of fair share and differentiated responsibility. That comes out in the

Amy Westervelt: Yeah.

Ruth McKie: part under the Paris Agreement and Article four. And I think this idea of equity and ensuring justice justice, it really feeds into the stalemate that then proceeds within U Conventions, U-N-S-A-C conventions almost given the example of sort of the [00:13:00] Indian negotiations.

And it presents that another bigger question around, well, what do these global U-N-F-C-C conventions. Do, are they there to push for strong climate action or are they there to do this slowly or even muddy the waters along this path? And it actually presents a problem for the probably bold action that needs to get taken to address the climate crisis.

So I think it

Amy Westervelt: it.

Ruth McKie: it against, I guess another way to say it, it's this idea of fairness with established within, within Article four. The Paris agreements fundamentally is saying, well, it's equity, it's striving for equity. And so the start from the [00:14:00] place, but I don't think equity really means and connects with justice in and of itself.

And I think that's something that underlines what

Amy Westervelt: will align what

Ruth McKie: these large U-N-F-C-C conference conferences do stand for. Equity and increase in equity, but they can't necessarily represent justice and in this case, climate justice, what we would like to see in terms of climate justice. So I think that might be one of the bigger, I guess, institutional problems of the U-N-F-C-C in their role and how that plays out.

Lent.

Amy Westervelt: Yeah. Relatedly, I wanna have you define and talk a little bit about loss and damage. 'cause I feel like, you know, it's, it gets talked about at every UNF Triple C conference and everyone's like, yeah, we should do it. And like, we're gonna do it, and then they just don't do it. So, so, yeah. I'm, I'm curious Yeah.

Just for what you've [00:15:00] found on that and how, particularly the persistent failure to actually come through on loss and damage promises has made it easier for global south countries to kind of be like, well, forget it then. We can't work on this stuff if you guys aren't gonna be serious about helping to fund it.

Ruth McKie: I think again, it goes to the stalemate and connects with what we've talked about. So this idea of loss and damage. So we mentioned this in the book, it's around the third pillar of global climate governance. So I think it helps shift from the, even the mitigating mitigation adaptation to an actual more formal financial role of providing the finances to cover the harmful impacts particularly in the global south.

And it's based on the be unavoidable reality that climate change has and will impact. On these [00:16:00] countries more so than other countries. And that goes back to the history. Think back to those geo, that geopolitical context and the historic colonial history, the neo, neo imperial history that surrounds these current relations where loss and damage is there to say, well, we are going to support you and provide you the resources to deal with these impacts.

But fundamentally that means that global, global north countries are now under, I guess, of seeking financial obligations. And when you've got that fin, those financial obligations to contribute to that loss and damage pillar, it's

giving the, again, it's. To that contentious [00:17:00] geopolitical environment with political interest, financial interest, economic stability. The conversations then go, well, how do we, how can we sort of give away so much of this money to support loss and damage for the impacts that we've, the global North, taken responsibility for its actions to put plainly.

But I guess that also comes, and this, I don't necessarily think it comes across in the chapter, but it's also reminds me of a acceptance of responsibility that the Global North is failing to achieve more so than just not wanting to spend money. It's, it then means that there is that responsibility and that ownership that needs to then.

Be accepted. And I still think when it comes [00:18:00] to global, the global North Actions, Western Europe, the US taking responsibility for that history, admitting that that's happened is what then stalls the negotiations. So we talk about word perfect policy, but an off the cuff comment would be sort of, is that a confession?

Do you admit guilt here? And for me, that's the sense that that ongoing stalling, that word perfect policy idea, is the attempt to pause and prevent responsibility then being ironed out into this financial support. Which then again creates that stalemate. Well, if they're not going to do it, well, we're not going to do it.

And the back and forth and the back and forth continues to happen. So I think loss and damage is that necessary step that needs to be taken, that financial support to deal with those [00:19:00] consequences by the global north. But in reality, that does mean accepting more responsibility for which many countries in the global North fundamentally in there are not willing to do, given the complex social, political, and economic context that each country has in and of themselves.

So I think loss and damage is central is, but I think at the same time that's going, that is stalled because it takes too much to admit responsibility and thus the consequences that have come with that.

Omar Faruque: Yeah, I'll just add one particular point here. Even though the loss and damage that third pillar, which emerged in recent years within UN COP system. The global north countries, powerful countries, particularly the European Union and the [00:20:00] United States, they made sure that there is no such thing there within, within, within decision making process as something that will point towards their legally mandatory obligation or something. So they, they, they make sure that such arrangements, loss and damage will not really bind them towards any sort of legal obligations. So even though that, that, that was removed from this processes in the past several years, it is only about financial support is not. Compensation or reparation. Those words are not there is is simply financial support for global south countries and we see very little in terms of [00:21:00] financial contribution to that fund as of now. Very little.

Amy Westervelt: Yeah, it's shocking every time I look at. I don't know, just some of the historical commitments versus what's actually been paid out.

Okay, so I wanna talk about we, this has come up already a little bit, the structural issues in geopolitical shifts in climate politics which are very, very complicated. So can I have you talk about the traditional approach to development and especially you know, development and growth and how that kind of often gets pitted against climate action?

Omar Faruque: Yeah, so this is something that, that we discussed at length not just in this chapter, but also while preparing a policy brief. And and eventually this chapter, this traditional approach to development shaped by the ironclad belief in a new classical [00:22:00] economic system. Emphasizing growth, development, prosperity, improved human development through market driven processes is something that is that has historically shaped development approaches around the world, not just in the global south around the world, in global north as well. The main focus is that, okay, if we focus on economic growth, market driven economic growth, it'll increase not just economic share of, of these countries, but also increase competitiveness. And in that process of achieving growth, prosperity, and improved human development, certainly greenhouse gas emission will, will shoot up. And the logic is that countries will be able to address high greenhouse gas [00:23:00] emissions at some point in their development trajectory by using resources that they accumulated through this path of economic growth and prosperity through their actions in, in this process. So, so is the market driven approach. We characterize it as traditional approach in the sense actually the appropriate word would be the mainstream dominant approach to development, focusing on market driven mechanisms. We call it. Mainstream or dominant, because there are other approaches as well focusing on sustainability, focusing on inclusion and other issues which involve, include critique of, of these traditional approaches. So the, the idea is that I'm summarizing this complex phenomenon. The idea is relying on market driven [00:24:00] processes to develop resources to address economic concerns. Along the way we will contribute to greenhouse gas emissions, but we'll be able to deal with that at some point in that trajectory by relying on resources accumulated from this process.

Ruth McKie: And I think it's important to add there as well, is that we think about marketing that market driven approach, that dominant approach. And we don't necessarily touch on this in the chapter, but there's a lot of literature as well as scientific evidence that attributes, and we have to acknowledge the tribute between these market driven dominant approach, neoclassic economics, that have expanded across the world over the past 100 years and have had such negative impacts on the environment with the rise in greenhouse gas emissions.

So I [00:25:00] think it's fair to say, I'm not going to say that. Capitalism is killing the climate. That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that there's certainly a relationship between how the market is structured and how, and the impact that it has had on greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, when you have that very, that very much tunnel vision that dominates the economy as well as dominates the political environment, you will then constantly feed into a developmental model that will pit the environment against economic growth and prosperity.

So until we diiv, you cannot divorce the two. So until you start to see an alternative that development model, [00:26:00] then trying to address this. The climate crisis crisis will, I guess, facilitate the opportunity for obstruction to happen.

Amy Westervelt: Mm-hmm.

Ruth McKie: So we talk about in some of the outside literature

for instance, we create new environments for, say, trying to take place.

So we talk about how, in the case of carbon credit systems, so we've talked about fraud within carbon credit, credit systems you've created for an environment, for a crime to take place. But that new environment is also based on climate change. The, this neoclassical approach, this that will negatively impact the environment.

So.

Amy Westervelt: So

Ruth McKie: You are opening doors to try and [00:27:00] address the climate crisis, but within an environment which is not going to do so. And I think that's an important point to show why actually approaches to development that dominate the, that dominate society that will dominate UN FCC negotiations, that dominate politics will fundamentally stall the progress required and

Amy Westervelt: Yeah,

Ruth McKie: in of themselves.

Omar Faruque: Have you heard this phrase in Canada? Decarbonized oil.

Amy Westervelt: oil. Yes. We've heard it in the US too. Occidental Petroleum claims to have shipped the first barrel of net zero oil, carbon negative oil.

It's, it's outrageous. Yeah. Yeah.

Omar Faruque: it is, it's, it's beyond comprehension, like the fraud and all sorts of things are now so deeply ingrained in, [00:28:00] in thought processes of our policy makers that they can say something decarbonized oil, and that's how you reach your net zero goal.

Amy Westervelt: It blows my mind that people are like, but it makes sense on the spreadsheet though.

The atmosphere doesn't care about your spreadsheet, you know? Actually, I wanna ask you guys about how these two things that we've been talking about kind of come together.

'cause there's the really complex UNF triple C stuff happening, and then there's all of the, the market forces stuff. And I feel like it is creating this situation where a lot of global south countries are getting into the oil business now, and they're talking about using that money to pay for climate adaptation because there's such a failure on international climate negotiations to get money to, to deal with this problem that they're now dependent on oil companies and the money from them to, to pay for it.

Omar Faruque: [00:29:00] Yeah, that's

you mentioned that in your, in a note to us citing, particularly the case of Guyana, right?

Amy Westervelt: Yes.

Omar Faruque: they are, I, I have watched many.

speeches by Guyana's president, who talks very eloquently and. Captivates audience in describing sort of

Amy Westervelt: they were a really early mover on carbon

Omar Faruque: Yeah, because,

because they have intact forest and very rich biodiverse forest areas so that they can use that. But in, in terms of the issue of extractive industry logics to address climate action, Ghana is, is, such a fascinating case to see how they the present their case. And it shows, as you rightly pointed out, the, the failure of UN triple C system to, to mobilize financial support for these countries. Guyana, [00:30:00] most, most I, I, I guess, vast area of that country is below the sea level. And it will go underwater in coming few years.

And it will require tons of resources and, and technical knowhow to address those concerns. So who will pay for that?

Amy Westervelt: yeah,

Omar Faruque: They are like, oil discovery is something that provided them with this opportunity.

Amy Westervelt: Yeah.

Omar Faruque: I'm not quite sure whether I'm, I'm very pessimistic in this regard. I'm not quite sure whether, even if UNFCCC system

mobilizes trillions

for, for global south countries, it will sort of persuade them

Amy Westervelt: them. Mm-hmm.

Omar Faruque: to move away from extractive development pathway

Amy Westervelt: Yeah.

Omar Faruque: I have seen from you reporting also [00:31:00] about Guyana that. There is a deep connections between carbon majors and political elite within Guyana.

Amy Westervelt: Yeah.

Omar Faruque: and, and this president, the current president, he acknowledged several times the contract between Guyana and, and, and, and the oil company is one-sided. And he, he, he, his administration cannot really do much

to address this disparity in the contract

Amy Westervelt: Yeah.

Omar Faruque: because the political elites and carbon majors are, on the same page in terms of exporting resources as well as exploiting a poor country in the global south.

Amy Westervelt: Okay. I wanna talk about how these geopolitical things show up with respect to then, not just the approach to development, but the actual investments in development from the development banks. So I'll give another example from Guyana. There was this really interesting thing that happened in the course of [00:32:00] them kind of building out their oil industry, where at a certain point the Biden administration in the US said that's it. The inter America's Development Bank. We're not gonna fund fossil fuel infrastructure anymore. And so, the vice president said, well, then they should stop funding fossil fuel infrastructure in their own country. And I was like, he's not wrong. He's got a point. But they just kind of went, okay, fine.

And went and got the money from China instead.

So it's a good example of okay, so it shifts, but then it just kind of comes back around.

Omar Faruque: Yeah, I would say in terms of geopolitics, we we emphasize one particular point not just the role of new development bank led by Briggs Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. And recently they also added 10 more countries. So it's Briggs Plus, we'll emphasize one particular. One peculiar thing in terms of this [00:33:00] geopolitical shift, and that is the rise of a new development mechanism known as South Cooperation. So, for example historically it is widely documented by scholars that global north countries, especially the US and European powers, they used two major international financial institutions, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to to actually control first implement their preferred development and economic agendas in countries in the global south, as well as as, as exerting control over over them.

So. So with the rise of BRICs and, and financial mechanisms that they created with the new banking systems like the new development [00:34:00] bank, Asian infrastructure investment bank, we see a new development mechanism is emerging. So if Inter-American Development Bank with the as a result of the influence of the US administration decides not to invest in, in, fossil fuel based development projects in global South, they now have option to approach another funding mechanism. And that funding mechanism is, is quite different in terms of Condit is attached to those development projects. So traditionally world Bank and International Monetary Fund, they, they attach many draconian conditions to each and every of their loan agreements. And, and these [00:35:00] new arrangements that we see now emerging, they do not approach development interventions in the same way.

Attaching conditions predetermined conditions to, to a loan programs. Rather, they consider national needs, economic needs of their member countries and how they characterize a particular development, projects, and financial needs. And it is the job of this new development mechanisms, new development bank or Asian infrastructure improve investment bank to finance those projects that will lead to economic growth, prosperity. Cetera. And again, here comes the influence of these. As Ruth mentioned earlier, these tunnel vision of market driven development and climate action projects. So, so we see these, these south south [00:36:00] cooperation along with these newly created development, new, new development banks are really shaping the trajectory in, in, in, in, in the global south. Some there, there are some critiques that it may lead to greenhouse gas emissions. And we see from evidence, although we cannot quite clearly establish the correlation between the existence of the creation of this new development banks and the rising greenhouse gas emissions in the global south countries.

But suddenly. There there are forceful critique of these south south mechanisms that are, that are sort of not paying serious attention to climate, climate concerns arising out of their, their actions. For example, I can, I can take here one mention here, one example, very briefly, Bangladesh in South Asia [00:37:00] is now developing many, several huge coal power plants. Historically, world Bank and Asian Development Bank, these two financial institutions were the major provider of financial support for major infrastructure development projects in Bangladesh and elsewhere. Since. World Bank particularly decided some years ago not to finance in fossil fuel based development projects, particularly in several countries.

Bangladesh is one of them. Then Bangladesh found another way to secure financial support, and they leveraged, south South cooperation mechanism brought China India to, to support their, their fossil fuel based [00:38:00] infrastructure development projects. So even though civil society groups environmentalists, they ly opposed some of those projects, particularly one which is located near a UNESCO Heritage site, a fraile mangrove forest, they fail to persuade. Both Bangladeshi government as well as their southern partners, China, India, to, to relocate or even cancel the project. So South, south mechanism, new development banks, new financing mechanisms is certainly shaking up the the, the climate actions and policies in, in, in the global south.

Amy Westervelt: Okay. Let's talk about how multinational corporations fall into this. They're so helpful. What, how do they show up in this, complicated mix of things? We touched on this a little bit that, that they often [00:39:00] have a relationship with politic elites in global south countries. But again, with the caveat that this term incorporates a whole lot of different countries.

Yeah. How are multinational corporations getting involved here?

Ruth McKie: I think this, it's, it's another complex. Story to tell. And it does dive into some of the things that we've covered previously. But I think a good way to is illustrate it. So when we, when we discuss some of these, this in the chapter, we look at the Brazilian agribusiness sector context. And it's important to realize that it's not just island gas corporations.

I think fundamentally there's a difference and what we've talked about, what we know already about climate obstruction previously in what we hear a lot about in the news, the focus on Island Gas, Exxon [00:40:00] Mobile shell, all of those island gas actors, which have had a significant impact on, greenhouse gas emissions, but other sectors like the agribusiness sector are growing and increasingly high, high pollutant industries.

It's just, they'll be concentrated in different locations and one of those is basically in Brazil. The agri sector is now one of the biggest, I guess, exports that come within the, that come from the country. And one of the key things that we have to think about in the context of Brazil is the deep interrelation between the agribusiness sector and the, their influence on the political system, and particular what we call the Ruralist caucus, that has and is able to exert a significant level of influence [00:41:00] over.

Politics and when you had Bolsonaro in power. And we could speak to Bolsonaro and his a certain alignment with say, the now president of the United States, but at the time alignment in that shift towards the far right, but beyond even false nos re in Brazil, the ruralist of caucus has a significant, and has always had a significant presence within the National Con Con Congress.

And I think as a result, those ties with corporate actors to the political system in that country in particular, has allowed, I guess, a natural alignment between the political priority that comes from generating and expanding. [00:42:00] Growth in Brazil, it's that national priority improves the welfare of the population, all of that, even though we know that just that doesn't necessarily repeat and fall down and trickle down into improving the lives of millions of people.

But nonetheless, that those two priorities, the government priorities and corporate priorities fundamentally are aligned. And it's those multinational corporations that are around different states that have power and control within these different, they've got the political alliances, I guess, that they're then able to shape national level agendas for economic growth, which often relates to these carbon intensive industries and high profit making industries as well.

And so these multinationals, they have that lobbying [00:43:00] capacity, I guess, to really connect their ideas, their interests with political interests and those what is seemingly the public interests. And it's important to recognize that every, the public have their own opinions, can have their own ideas around climate action can resist it.

But the overarching impact is spoken through the media as well. And it's the narratives, the constant narratives that you will see, including those in right wing literature in Brazil that feed in and continue this, let's grow the economy. Let's push this sector. Let's not worry too much about climate change just yet because we need to.

We need to improve the conditions and lives of the public here and there. So I think it's [00:44:00] that, I guess political power that they're able to harness, but also their role in managing the media as well. And we've seen that with the history of ExxonMobil and the infiltration of, say, oil and gas is something natural to society.

It's so normalized within, but behind naturalizing and normalizing oil and gas, it's normalizing the political economy, continuing the neoclassical model of economics to continue that. And so I think that's one big way in which multinationals are able to capture states, but also how states can align with multinational interests.

So I think it's a two. It's a two way but very complex relationship that allows these large sectors to continue, do what they're doing without the repercussions [00:45:00] afterwards. And it even plays out in sort of legislation, say for instance, and changing land uses for instance. Which was it?

That was it. So in terms of between sort of 1919, 2018 in Brazil, there was like this change. And policy around land uses. So it's A-F-O-L-U, so it's the agricultural forestry and other land uses. So that's how we refer to one way in which emissions are, and the way emissions are come from the agricultural forestry and other land.

The land uses industry, but that also ties with the land grabbing that would then be exerted in terms of environmental [00:46:00] protection. So essentially, especially during the Bolsonaro administration, environmental protection, environmental essentially decreased. So legislation was churned and, and it was adjusted to boost, for instance, agricultural production, so that in the agribusiness sector was able to have an influence over those policies.

So they're able to essentially target the political system and influence policy development so that it becomes open to opportunities to continue extracting resources. In this case, making sure there's room for agricultural development. But that impact on say land use in Brazil is the same type of impact on environmental protection policies that the fossil fuel industry is able to exert say in the us.

So I think there's a similar picture that [00:47:00] appears that we've seen in the global south, that we've seen in the global North that then also appears in the global south that is facilitated by these multinational corporations. So while there are distinctions to how multinational corporations. Interact in the global south and its impacting climate obstruction.

There are some commonalities and I guess common modus operandi that exist, and particularly around changing and adapting policy for their interests. So there's evidence, I guess, that there's a consistent pattern of multinational corporations working with states vested interests to exploit under the guise, I guess, of development, continuing this neoclassic growth model.

And those, all the consequences of that that [00:48:00] come from environmental destruction marginalization moving people out of their communities such as in the case of the indigenous people in the Amazon rainforest. So I think it's a common. You'll see common examples from multinational corporations and states in the global south and how they operate to obstruct climate action that we've seen in other, in the global north like the us, although it's not necessarily one, which is of what you might be used to of open denial and just the purposeful dismantling of environmental protections that are more ideological, anti-science based that we've seen maybe in some of the global north countries.

So the same pattern emerges is what I'm trying to say.[00:49:00]

Amy Westervelt: Yeah, it's funny, like, I don't know. I feel like every time I am looking at this, I'm, I just come to the conclusion that it's maybe slightly better hidden in some global north countries, and that's about it. They've slapped a coat of paint on it. I just wanna ask you guys this last question, if you have a minute about what could be done to fight climate obstruction in the global south and what, what has worked and what does that fight kind of look like?

Ruth McKie: I think maybe is one of the things I wanna start off with is actually to begin with the risks that people face. So I think it's fundamentally, we have to be aware that a fight can take place and we can push forward for change. But I think actually navigating, [00:50:00] say if you are an academic or you are a environmental group, working on local level mobilization, that's one of the key ways in which groups have already started to do this. But we have to think about the risks that people are facing. So we've heard about things like environmental defenders and environmental defenders have been targeted as they try to challenge the deforestation across the Amazon.

And when you've got such a lock in between. The extractive industries, state interests, political interests, corporate interests. It presents a risk that I think has to then be thought of very carefully in terms of what actions can be taken. So we know that we've got [00:51:00] engagement from NGOs within U-N-F-C-C negotiations, but when you've got countries where NGOs are going in, so countries from the global south with their NGO representatives, there are a fewer number who are able to access those platforms to engage in the negotiations process.

So at a national, at an international level, and capacity wise, being able to influence those higher level decisions. Becomes harder and harder and harder. And I think that also speaks to the problems of these big multilateral agreements that don't, and are not really, they are doing something but still don't seem to take the bold steps.

And so I think it's really important that we turn to local level, but also be vitally aware of the complexities of within countries, [00:52:00] what's going on, how political conditions are perceived, what you can take. For instance, even even in the Global West, the global north, the approach to environmental protestors and terrorism charges stacked on to, and I'm not so environmental groups, so that local level mobilization, that has to come from the people. But it's also to be fundamentally aware that this political and social context needs to be navigated very carefully as there is this particularly a shift to the political right as well, which we can see being across the world.

So I wanted to get conversation out.

Omar Faruque: I'll, I'll just add one, one particular issue to the local dimensions of [00:53:00] environmental climate mobilization. I'd also suggest that legal mechanisms, legal venues, legal fight is something,

Amy Westervelt: ICJ

Omar Faruque: yeah. Is the,

Amy Westervelt: that just happened.

Yeah.

Omar Faruque: thing that happened if just two days ago. So the local court mobilization is something that I see. A fruitful way to really put pressure on political elites in our writing. We mentioned in our chapter, we mentioned one case of Sri Lanka, which in both Sri Lanka and Bangladesh vibrant environmental mobilization a contested fossil fuel energy infrastructure projects Sri Lankan mobilization succeeded. Bangladesh Shi case failed because in the case of Sri Lanka environmental advocates, they, they engage their core system and and that [00:54:00] actually persuaded forced the Sri Lankan government to, to cancel the project and negotiate a renewable energy projects with Indian. Indian, financier. So, so local mobilization, again, I will emphasize one particular thing that is being aware of, of local political context particularly with this growing trend of criminalizing energy and climate politics in the home of liberal democratic principles in, in the global north. We are now seeing activists are, are given jail sentences, 3, 4, 5, 6 years for just protesting participating in protests.

So being aware of local political, economic and legal context. But I'm, I'm pessimistic about transnational global thing. I'm more interested in [00:55:00] locally rooted activism, but again, being aware of. Political maneuvering that is happening within their context. That is something that give us hope, at least from different cases around the world that we see.